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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
SEPTEMBER 2010
PHILIP PABLO MELLIZO, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Peter Skott and Professor Jeffrey Carpenter
Overview
Economists typically understand the firm as an organization comprised of 
a series of incomplete contracts among input suppliers (e.g. Coase, (1937), 
Williamson, (1985)).  The ultimate right to make decisions that are not subject to a 
pre-existing contractual arrangement – hereafter referred to as decision-control  
rights, are assigned to some person or group associated with the enterprise.  The 
entity with decision-control rights has the final say over how to organize 
essential firm operations that range from the determination of production 
techniques, to deciding how to monitor or compensate the firm's members.1  To 
1 As an example, if management is held accountable by all of the laborers (or shareholders as the case 
vii
the extent that firm members have competing interests or are asymmetrically 
affected by such decisions, those members with decision-control rights may be 
confronted with important normative issues regarding which firm objectives 
should be pursued.  In my dissertation, I employ a behavioral economic 
perspective in order to examine how workplace governance practices interact 
with both the level of satisfaction and motivation of workers.  
In the first essay of the dissertation, I collected data from a real-effort 
experiment to compare changes in the performance of research participants that 
were subjected to an identical set of wage incentives that were either 
implemented (1) endogenously by the group to which subjects belong through a 
simple majority vote, (2) endogenously by only one member of the group who 
had all decision-control rights, or (3) a random process completely exogenous to 
the group. The 3 (3 distinct decision-control rights regimes) X 2 (2 distinct 
incentive contracts) between-subjects design allows for a clean comparison of 
performance under different decision-control rights treatments.  I report 
evidence suggesting that the decision-control rights arrangement used to select 
the compensation contract can significantly influence the subsequent level of 
performance of research subjects.
may be) in the firm insofar that they can override or replace management of the firm, then the decision-
control rights are ultimately held by labor and not the management.  
viii
The second essay (co-authored with Michael Carr), analyzes the relative 
effects of voice, autonomy, and wages in explaining job satisfaction using 
subjective evaluations of work conditions and satisfaction recorded in the 2004 
wave of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS).  We show that the 
amount of autonomy and voice that a worker has over the firm is an important 
omitted variable, biasing the estimated coefficient on the wage upwards.  And, 
conditional upon having a job, voice and autonomy are considerably more 
important determinants of job satisfaction than the wage.
The final essay offers  a critique of the traditional economics of work 
organization in consideration of the literature developed in behavioral and 
experimental economics. I argue that many models of worker motivation 
developed using the rational choice model (RCM) carry the cost of ignoring 
common sentiments and behaviors that have been systematically demonstrated 
in experimental studies.  After providing an extensive review of the experimental 
economics literature as it may inform various workplace organizational faculties, 
I conclude that the literature suggests that establishment of work teams and 
incentive schemes that reward teams for collective success would carry the 
expectation of sustained satisfaction and productivity of workers more than firm 
environments that rely on employee competition as a motivational device.
ix
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Economists typically understand the firm as an organization comprised of 
a series of incomplete contracts among input suppliers (e.g. Coase, (1937), 
Williamson, (1985)).  The ultimate right to make decisions that are not subject to a 
preexisting contractual arrangement – hereafter referred to as decision-control  
rights, are assigned to some person or group associated with the enterprise.  The 
entity with decision-control rights will have the final say over how to organize 
essential firm operations that range from the determination of production 
techniques, to deciding how to monitor or compensate the employees.1  To the 
extent that different firm members have competing interests or are 
asymmetrically affected by such decisions, those members with decision-control 
rights may be confronted with important normative issues regarding which firm 
objectives should be pursued.  For example, it may be the case that policies that 
pursue firm profits for shareholders would be distinct from those that maximize 
net-income per worker (Vanek, 1970), or similarly, policies intended to promote 
higher short term growth rates might be in conflict with various “quality of 
work-life” goals that would otherwise be pursued by workers with control 
1 As an example, if management is held accountable by all of the laborers (or shareholders as the case 
may be) in the firm insofar that they can override or replace management of the firm, then the decision-
control rights are ultimately held by labor and not the management.  
1
rights.  Of course, different decision-control rights distributions (e.g. board of 
directors consisting of shareholders, labor-managed firms, employee 
representation, co-governance etc.) can be expected to arise in practice 
depending on various factors including the willingness for firm members 
without decision-control rights to consent to those with decision-control rights, 
the legal restrictions outlined by local or national governments, and the 
procedural norms common among firm members.  
Investment that expands the capital stock or towards technological 
development generally lead to higher levels of firm efficiency, but productivity is 
not determined exclusively by technologies and small changes in the 
productivity of labor could potentially have a large impact.  Thus the viability of 
a firm in a competitive economy is contingent upon its ability to sustain 
sufficiently high levels of labor productivity.  The dissertation investigates the 
interaction between the organizational and decision-making processes and 
productivity of labor.  This question has received a fair amount of attention by 
economists over the years (e.g. Alchien and Demsetz, (1972);  Holmstrom, (1982); 
Levin and Tyson, (1990)), but the existing literature has at least three significant 
shortcomings.  
First, the vast majority of the theoretical analysis in labor and personnel 
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economics is based on the rational choice model (RCM) where all agents 
rationally optimize their private material gains across all social contexts.  The 
study of price incentives in the RCM has produced valuable models of incentives, 
compensation, and job search.  These developments, however, have come at the 
cost of ignoring common behaviors and psychological tendencies such as loss 
aversion, guilt, procrastination, envy, consent to authority, happiness, altruism, 
or solidarity.  Those aspects of behavior, which are excluded from the RCM, 
surely influence workplace performance.  The investigation of these issues, 
however, has received surprisingly little attention in Economics; including 
Behavioral Economics.  
Second, empirical work that investigates how different decision-control 
rights arrangements affect firm performance face difficult challenges.  It is hard 
to adequately control for firm idiosyncrasies in production and organization, the 
level of industrial concentration, the presence or absence of price-controls or 
subsidies, state-specific tax structures, and general labor market conditions, 
when investigating a specific behavioral relationship.  These difficulties suggest 
that controlled lab experiments might provide a testing ground to evaluate 
behavior under various organizational structures.  Although experiments can 
only claim to be stylized representations of real-world economies, experiments 
3
often reveal systematic behavioral tendencies typically not accounted for by 
standard assumptions.  Despite the many empirical studies that have sought to 
investigate how the distribution of decision-control rights affects productivity, to 
the best of my knowledge, none have used the experimental methodology to test 
this directly.  
Finally, while research in neighboring behavioral sciences has advanced 
our collective knowledge of human motivation, satisfaction, and other important 
job attitudes, economists have generally not operated within this 
interdisciplinary space.  For example, in dealing with the canonical 'agency 
problem,' the economic perspective has primarily focused on how best to use 
monetary incentives to align the interests of managers and capital owners.  It is 
likely, however, that additional psychological, social, or political factors influence 
principal-agent outcomes.  The large body of work dedicated to investigating 
these issues in Organizational Behavior, Management Studies, and Industrial 
Psychology, are only cross-referenced by Economists in exceptional cases.  While 
it is certainly a challenge to organize and translate concepts across disciplines in 
a systematic and coherent manner, the potential benefits from interdisciplinary 
study are large.  
In the dissertation, I contribute to filling these deficiencies.  In the first 
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essay, I collected data from a real-effort experiment to compare changes in the 
performance of research participants that were subjected to an identical set of 
wage incentives that were either implemented (1) endogenously by the group to 
which subjects belong through a simple majority vote, (2) endogenously by only 
one member of the group who had all decision-control rights, or (3) a random 
process completely exogenous to the group.  I compare performance across 
treatments (between-subjects design) and report evidence suggesting that the 
decision-control rights arrangement used to select the compensation contract can 
significantly influence the subsequent level of performance of research subjects.
The second essay conducts an econometric exercise that analyzes the 
relative effects of voice, autonomy, and wages in explaining job satisfaction using 
subjective evaluations of work conditions and satisfaction recorded in the 2004 
wave of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS).  We show that the 
variability of employee satisfaction is driven by subjective evaluation scores of 
worker autonomy and voice.  Our findings suggest that while wages may be an 
important determinant of job choice, it is not the most important determinant of 
job satisfaction, particularly when compared to autonomy and employee voice.
The final essay reviews experimental economic work that has aimed to 
test personnel models of incentive contracts, the role of general labor market 
5
conditions, loyalty, job satisfaction, intrinsic motivation, and the effect of 
different firm governance structures.  Because the firm is partly a kind of 
marketplace -- with institutions that support specific contractual exchange 
relations -- and partly a place where people interact expressively as whole 
personalities, economists need to go beyond the RCM to understand the effects 
of organizational structures on the productivity and motivation of workers.  The 
review shows that a substantial gap remains between the work in industrial 
psychology and that done within economics on examining the motivational 
effects of different workplace governance practices and asset ownership 
distributions.  Experimental methodologies, however, offer a method to test 
several behavioral claims made outside of economics, and also facilitate their 
inclusion into economic practice.  
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CHAPTER 2
AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF PERFORMANCE 
UNDER HIERARCHICAL AND PARTICIPATORY DECISION-
MAKING PROCEDURES
2.1  Introduction
Firms constantly make decisions that affect the conditions of work for 
their employees.  The economics literature shows strong disagreements over both 
how such decisions should be reached, and which firm members should be 
included in making these decisions.  The most common model of firm 
governance employs a centralized decision-making authority, but participatory 
models that delegate decision-making responsibilities to workers can be 
regularly observed.  For example, Kruse et al. (2008) find that up to 40% of 
employees in the U.S. report having a lot of influence on firm decisions or say 
they often participate with other workers in job decisions.  Historically, the push 
for “employee empowerment initiatives” and similar programs have often been 
seen as responding to general concerns of fairness, job satisfaction, workplace 
trust, and perhaps most importantly for economists, as promoting the 
productivity of workers (e.g. Freeman and Rogers (2006), Dow, (2003)). 
7
While scores of studies have sought to compare how different firm-
governance structures help or hinder the attainment of firm goals, it has proven 
difficult to resolve whether the decision-making architecture of the firm is 
associated with a systematic behavioral effect on the motivation and subsequent 
performance of workers.2  Much of the ambiguity in the empirical literature may 
be due to the difficulty of controlling for confounding factors such as distinct 
production technologies, market conditions, monitoring structures, and 
compensation methods that complicate identification of worker performance. 
Another hurdle that labor economists are traditionally confronted with is how to 
control for employee ability when evaluating how a policy or governance 
structure affects worker performance.  Self-reports, attitudinal surveys, IQ tests, 
years of education, quality of education, resume quality, years of job experience, 
and managerial evaluations have been used in many labor studies to 
approximate unobservable worker characteristics like skill and intrinsic 
motivation.  These proxy measures can be noisy and this may also contribute to 
mixed findings in the literature.  
In an effort to mitigate the confounding issues, this paper uses a controlled 
2 The meta-analysis conducted by Levin and Tyson (1990) analyzing the effects of participation on 
productivity conclude that, “Our overall assessment of the empirical literature from economics, 
industrial relations, organizational behavior and other social sciences is that participation usually leads 
to small, short-run improvements in performance and sometimes leads to significant, long-lasting 
improvements in performance” (emphasis in original).
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laboratory experiment to investigate whether the performance of workers is 
sensitive to the provision of decision-control rights over a meaningful decision – 
the determination of workers' compensation structure.  
We collected data from a real-effort experiment to compare changes in the 
performance of research participants subjected to an identical set of wage 
incentives that were either implemented (1) endogenously by the group to which 
subjects belong through a simple majority vote, (2) endogenously by only one 
member of the group who had all decision-control rights, or (3) a random 
process completely exogenous to the group.  By design, we control for all issues 
that pertain to monitoring, punishment, threats, or other forms of coercion that 
might also accompany many types of systems of control in real-world firms.  
The data collected in our experiment limit our investigation to an 
examination of observed behavioral differences that arise under different 
decision-making processes for group decisions.  We further strip down the effort 
task so that it is not reliant on team production technologies to minimize 
confounds that could arise in social dilemmas (i.e. trust, reciprocity, reputation 
etc) and restrict the menu of potential compensation schemes, to two where all 
claims on residual profits are held by labor.  Our real-effort task additionally 
allows us to collect measures of both effort (trying hard) and effective effort 
9
(quality of work).  
We use a 3 (3 distinct decision-control rights regimes) X 2 (2 distinct 
incentive contracts) between-subjects design in order to have an apples-to-apples 
comparison of performance under different decision-control rights treatments. 
All subjects in each session of our experiment participated in 3 periods.  In Period 
1, all subjects were paid a flat-wage to solve simple addition problems for 5 
minutes.  The instructions in Period 1 made clear that all subjects would receive a 
flat-wage that was independent of their effort in Period 1. In Period 2 of the 
experiment, all subjects were randomly and anonymously put into groups of 3, 
and were told that they would be again be solving problems for 5 minutes, but 
that the method by which they would be compensated for their performance in 
Period 2 was contingent upon the implementation of one of two possible 
incentive contracts – either a rank-order tournament with endogenous prize 
creation (referred to as CS1 in the experiment instructions), or a group revenue-
sharing contract (referred to as CS2 in the experiment instructions).  Depending 
on the treatment that subjects were in, the decision over which compensation 
scheme would be implemented for the duration of Period 2 was either made 1) 
endogenously by vote where all 3 group members had equitable decision-control 
rights (hereafter referred to as the Voting treatment), 2) endogenously by a single 
10
group member determined at random with all decision-control rights (Authority 
treatment), or 3) exogenously by the computer (Control treatment).  Period 3 in 
our experiment was identical to Period 1, where subjects were again paid a flat-
wage for 5-minutes to solve addition problems.  
We report evidence suggesting that the performance of subjects in our 
experiment is sensitive to the decision-control rights arrangement used to select 
the compensation contract.  Consistent with intuition, allowing groups of 
workers to participate in determining the compensation scheme for their group 
increases effort significantly.  While this may not be surprising, ours is the first 
study to confirm the intuitive result for group level decisions.  Specifically, we 
find that both endogenous decision-making arrangements in our study result in 
significantly higher performance -- measured both in total effort provided, and 
effective effort-- than decisions made by a random process completely exogenous 
to the group.  Further, these effects persist even after controlling for gender, 
compensation scheme, expressed preferences for a compensation scheme, and 
ability.   
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2.2 Related Research
Labor costs account for the vast majority of production costs, implying 
that small increases in effort per worker can have a significant influence on 
output production (Blinder (1990)), but the level of effort that workers provide 
cannot be directly contracted (Bowles and Gintis, (1988)).  This familiar agency 
dilemma has spawned a great deal of research into the potential motivational 
properties of different compensation schemes (e.g. Stiglitz, (1975), Lazear and 
Rosen, (1981)), monitoring structures (e.g. Alchien and Demzetz (1972), general 
labor market conditions (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz, (1984)) and other 'strategic 
human resource management' designs that are developed with the intention of 
influencing the level of effort offered by workers.3  The vast majority of the 
theoretical work in this tradition is rooted in identifying incentives that would 
appeal to the rational actor, yet personnel issues like worker motivation can be 
much more complicated and for this reason, its analysis will likely require a 
behavioral perspective.  Berg (2006) points out that in a field like labor economics 
that is so heavily data driven, the incorporation of experiments as a research 
methodology has been relatively limited.4  
3 See Prendergast (1999) for excellent survey on theory and practice of incentive mechanisms and Baron 
and Kreps (1999) for an introduction to contemporary themes in personnel management.
4 For a general overview on the use of experiments in labor market experiments see Falk and Fehr (2003). 
For reviews of findings, see Mellizo (2010) and Charness and Kuhn (2010).  
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The use of experiments to investigate labor and personnel matters, 
however, has already contributed much to the field of study.  For example, 
experiments have 'cleanly' revealed that incentive structures that should elicit 
equivalent effort from rational and selfish agents, influence humans in 
systematically different ways.  For example, Bull et al. (1987) compare the 
efficacy of tournaments and piece-rates in a chosen-effort lab experiment, finding 
that mean effort levels under either compensation scheme were roughly 
equivalent, but further found that a much larger variance was observed within 
all of their tournament specifications, than under the piece-rate scheme.  In a 
similar vein, van Dijk et al. (2001) use a real-effort experiment finding that 
individual and team payment schemes induced similar effort levels, while 
Freeman and Gelber (2010) observe that output for groups under tournament 
contracts that result in moderate levels of inequality was significantly higher 
than when payment was either independent of the participants' performance, or 
when the level of inequality resulting from the tournament prize was high.  Of 
course, by now behavioral findings that are inconsistent with predictions of the 
rational actor model no longer come as a surprise to economists, but much more 
importantly, the use of experiments has shown that in many cases both non-
rational, and non-selfish behavioral deviations from the standard theoretical 
13
predictions are systematic, common, and replicable (e.g. Rabin, 1998).  Moreover, 
the expanded use of the experimental method has helped in revealing 
preferences that reflect the norms and values supported by different social 
environments (e.g. Henrich et al. (2001))
To illustrate the last point as it relates to workplace organization, many 
firms are structured to encourage competition among their employees, yet it has 
been reported that competitive institutions might bias performance outcomes for 
workers.  For example, Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) find that one 
source of systematic variation in performance of solving mazes can be explained 
by gender, where the performance of women is less responsive to competitive 
environments than it is for men in their sample.  Similarly, Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) find evidence suggestive of gendered attitudes towards 
competition-- that is, given the choice to enter or not enter a competitive 
environment, many women would prefer not to, even when it would be in their 
monetary interest to do so.  They additionally find, however, that men often elect 
to enter into competitive situations far more often than they should.  While the 
experimental economics literature has only begun to explore why there are 
gendered attitudes towards competition, findings from a very interesting field 
experiment conducted by Gneezy, Leonard, and List (2006) suggest that 
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processes of socialization play a central role in shaping preferences towards 
competition.  They find that women in matriarchal societies are more likely to 
demonstrate a preference to compete than men, while the reverse was true in 
patriarchal societies.  To the extent that these findings are externally valid to firm 
environments in patriarchal societies, they may contribute to an explanation for 
persistent asymmetries common in labor market outcomes, such as the large 
discrepancies between the proportion of males and females in competitive 
professions.5   Other studies, however, have shown that if subjects are allowed to 
sort themselves into (or away from) a particular wage-structure that the outcome 
typically results in higher average levels in performance (e.g. Cadsby et al. 
(2005); Eriksson et al. (2006); Teyssiar (2008); Dohmen and Falk (2006)).  
   While it is certainly the case that some workers study the institutional 
features of the firm prior to entry, we analyze the situation where firms change 
working conditions for existing employees.  Our study extends the literature by 
using the lab to explore how the distribution of control rights over a firm-level 
decision determining the compensation scheme for workers influences worker 
performance.  Dal Bo et al. (2007) and  Sutter et al. (2006) suggest that democratic 
processes over the selection of group-level institutions can affect the level of 
5 See Croson and Gneezy (2009) for an excellent review of the experimental economics literature 
highlighting gendered differences in attitudes and behavior and their potential impacts on labor market 
outcomes.
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cooperation observed in social dilemmas, but we believe ours to be the first 
experimental study to directly examine the impact of different decision making 
processes on worker performance.  
2.3 Experiment Design
In the Fall term of 2008, we recruited members of the University of 
Massachusetts-Amherst community via table-tents, fliers, and brief 
announcements given in lecture halls.  The participants in our study were not 
informed about the precise nature of the experiment before arrival.  In our 
recruitment, we promised a $5.00 show-up fee, plus the chance to earn additional 
money in the experiment.  Our recruitment procedure allowed subjects to self-
select into a time-slot that was convenient for their own schedule, and we 
confirmed their participation by email.  We conducted 21 sessions over a three-
week period.  Upon arriving at the experiment, a subject's experience in all 
treatments followed the following protocol.  First all subjects signed a consent 
form for their participation and were seated at a computer terminal where they 
found a sheet introducing the study to them and a copy of instructions for Period 
1 of the experiment.  After all subjects were seated, a lab assistant read both the 
16
introduction of the experiment, as well as the set of instructions for Period 1.  All 
subjects in all sessions received the same instructions for Period 1.
In Period 1 of the experiment, all subjects were paid a flat-wage contract of 
75 Experimental Units (30EUs = 1USD) for the task of adding together different 
sets of five two-digit numbers that appeared on their computer screen. 
Participants were not allowed to use a calculator, but could use scratch paper and 
a pencil that were provided to them.  After solving a problem, a subject would 
submit their answer and would be presented with a new problem to solve.  The 
numbers to be added together were randomly generated, but all subjects in a 
given treatment were presented with the same set of math problems, given in the 
same order.  We chose to use this specific real-effort because (1) we would expect 
adding sets of numbers together to yield a low intrinsic reward, (2) it requires 
little skill, (3) a typical college aged subject is familiar with simple arithmetic, and 
most importantly, (4) previous studies have found that this same real-effort task 
did not result in biased performance in any systematic manner (Niederle and 
Vesterlund, (2007)).6  When the 5 minutes of Period 1 were over, subjects were 
6 The program was written using zTree (Fischbacher 2007).  We gratefully acknowledge Muriel Niederle 
and Lise Vesterlund for sharing their zTree code used in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) for the 
production task of adding up sets of 5, 2-digit numbers.  The only difference between our instrument 
and the one used in Niederle and Vesterlund's piece is that in our experiment all subjects receive the 
same set of randomly generated math problems in the same order, where in the former paper each 
subject receives a new, randomly generated set of numbers in each math problem.  We made this 
adjustment in response to feedback surveys in our pilot runs where some subjects (unexpectedly) made 
the claim that they were concerned with the set of numbers that they might have to solve compared with 
other subjects.  That is, some subjects wanted to be sure that they would be solving the same problems 
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presented with a screen that displayed how many problems they correctly solved 
as well as a reminder of their earnings in Period 1 (a flat-wage of 75EUs). 
Subjects were not given any information regarding the performances of any other 
subjects at this time.  At this point, the subjects received a new set of instructions 
for Period 2 of the experiment.  
At the beginning of Period 2 of the experiment, subjects were informed 
that they had randomly and anonymously been assigned to a group of 3 total 
subjects.  Group members were connected only through the computer network, 
and for the remainder of the experiment the subjects never knew who was in 
their group.  In the instructions for Period 2, subjects received a message 
indicating to them that one of two possible compensation schemes would be 
implemented and that the scheme would affect the payout of all members of 
their group.  Both of the possible compensation schemes were simple incentive 
contracts where each correct answer from each member of the group was equal 
to the exogenously determined price of 10EUs.  In Period 2, all of the correct 
answers from all members of each group were summed together and multiplied 
by 10EU to create the total proceeds to the group.  The only distinction between 
the compensation contracts in Period 2 was the manner by which the total 
as everyone else.  To eliminate the potential for any noise arise in our data due to this concern, we made 
this minor adjustment to the original z-tree code used in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007).  
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proceeds were distributed back to the members within each group.  Under the 
tournament scheme, the person with the highest number of contributions to the 
group total was to receive 60% of all of the group proceeds, the second highest 
performer would receive 30% of the proceeds, and the third highest performer 
would receive 10% of the proceeds.  All ties were broken at random.  Under the 
revenue-sharing contract, the total proceeds were simply multiplied by a factor 
of 1/n so all members within the group would receive an equal share of the 
group proceeds.  The instructions also described how the decision to implement 
either compensation scheme would be made.  In each session only one treatment 
(i.e. one decision-making process) was implemented.  Subjects had no prior 
knowledge of which treatments would be run in a given session. The three 
decision-treatments are described below.
2.3.1  Decision-Treatments
Voting Treatment:  In the Voting Treatment, all members in the group had
equal decision-making rights in either implementing the tournament or
the revenue-sharing contract.  The specific procedure used was a
simple voting election where only a simple majority was required to 
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implement either compensation scheme.
Authority Treatment:  In the Authority Treatment, all members in the
group were informed that one of the three members would decide
whether to implement the tournament or the revenue-sharing contract.
Subjects in this treatment were informed that the decision maker would
be determined randomly by the computer.  
Control Treatment:  In the Control Treatment, all members in the group
were informed that the implementation of either the tournament or
revenue sharing contract would be done at random by the computer
program.
Before the 5-minute period of solving math problems began in Period 2, all 
subjects were informed of the outcome from the decision-making process 
regarding how they would be compensated for their efforts for the duration of 
Period 2.  At the end of the 5-minutes period, all subjects were presented with a 
screen indicating to them how many correct answers they provided, the group 
total of correct answers, their individual payoff, and their relative rank within 
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their group of three.  At this point, all subjects received a set of instructions for 
Period 3 of the experiment. 
Period 3 was identical to Period 1 with the exception of the math problems 
presented.  Like Period 1, subjects in Period 3 were compensated a flat-wage of 
75 EUs to solve simple addition problems for 5 minutes.  At the end of Period 3, 
all subjects were again presented with a summary screen indicating how many 
correct answers they had in Period 3, along with a reminder of their 
compensation in Period 3.  
We collected Period 3 data for two main reasons.  First, like Period 1 data, 
they provide an additional observation of ability and/or the willingness for 
subjects to provide effort in the absence of extrinsic incentives.  We also collect 
Period 3 data to conduct an auxiliary analysis in section 2.4.3 examining if Period 
3 effort could be explained by different experiment conditions.  
After Period 3 a brief survey was administered through the computer 
program that asked about a variety of background characteristics.  When all 
subjects were finished with the survey, each participant was called to the back of 
the room at random by number, where they received their payment in a sealed 
envelope.  
A total of 270 subjects (133 woman, 137 men) participated in the 
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experiment.  Subjects were predominately undergraduate students.  The average 
overall payoff in the experiment was about $14.00 and the duration of each 
session lasted for approximately 45 minutes.  
2.3.2  Pilot Experiments
It is important to note that the experiment was designed to compare 
behavior under exogenous and endogenous decision-making processes, and not 
to compare performances under different compensation schemes.  With this in 
mind, we wanted to create menus of compensation schemes that would be both 
very simple for subjects to understand, and that would each be reasonably 
appealing.  The contrasting qualities of the basic tournament and the revenue-
sharing contract simplify the decision for subjects increasing the possibility that 
the variance of behavior in the data can be attributed to treatment, rather than to 
possible confusion over the exact rules of each compensation scheme.  
The precise specification of the rank-order tournament used in our 
experiment (highest performer receives 60% or the total group proceeds, second 
highest performer receives 30% and lowest performer received 10%) was 
informed by several pilot experiments conducted with subjects from a separate 
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subject pool several weeks before the 'live' data collection began.  In the pilot 
experiments we wanted to collect several samples of preferences over various 
tournament specifications relative to the revenue-sharing contract to increase the 
probability that each compensation contract would be selected with a reasonable 
amount of behavioral regularity when 'live' data collection began.  Without 
extensive piloting of the tournament specification, we would have had to rely on 
theoretical predictions that would require the construction of bias in preferences 
(i.e. designing a tournament based on selfish preferences or with social 
preferences).  We concluded our pilot experiments when roughly half of our pilot 
subjects expressed a preference for the 60-30-10 tournament structure and the 
other half expressed a preference for the revenue sharing contract.  During the 
live data collection process, 57 groups in the Authority treatment (where 
decision-control rights were held by a single group member) selected the 
tournament contract and 33 selected the revenue sharing contract (90 total 
groups).  Of the the 93 groups in the Voting treatment (where decision-control 
rights were held by all group members) the majority voting rule resulted in 57 
tournament contracts and 36 revenue sharing contracts implemented by those 
groups.
We took the further precaution of first collecting data from the treatments 
23
with endogenous choice (Voting and Authority treatments) and then calibrated 
the randomization procedure in the Control treatment to match the frequency of 
the compensation scheme selection.  Table 2.1 shows that these precautions, in 
addition to a fair amount of luck, were very successful in generating the same 
frequency of selected compensation schemes across our treatments.    
Table 2.1:  Frequency of Compensation Scheme Selected by Treatment
Compensation scheme        Voting             Authority              Control               Total  
Revenue Sharing 
Tournament                               
Total 
          36                         33                         33                     102
          57                         57                         54                     168
          93                         90                         87                     270
 Standard theory would predict that differences in the level of effort 
between Period 1 (where all subjects paid a flat-wage) and Period 2 (where 
subjects are paid through an incentive contract), is independent of the process by 
which the incentive contract was implemented.  Our study examines the validity 
of this claim.  
2.4 Experiment Results
In the following section we present our results from the experiment. 
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2.4.1 Summary statistics
The analysis centers on effort, which we measure using the number of total 
attempted questions that subjects provided in each period, as well as their 
effective effort, measured by the total number of correct answers provided in each 
period.  Tables 2.2 and 2.3 provide subgroup summary statistics of total 
attempted answers correct answers across periods and treatments.  Histograms 
and statistical tests of equivalence of means across treatments are presented in 
Appendix A.  
Table 2.2 Total attempted questions (Effort)
Overall
  N    Mean  Std.Dev.
Voting
 N    Mean      Std.Dev.
 Authority 
 N      Mean    Std.Dev.
Control
 N       Mean 
Std.Dev.
Flat-wage 
(Period 1)
270      12.75         3.103 93      12.89          3.347  90       13.14        3.357 87        12.19       2.443
Tournament 
(Period 2)
168      15.78         3.559 57      15.87          3.932  57       16.66        3.700 54        14.75       2.684
Rev Sharing 
(Period 2)
102      13.98         2.883 36      13.88          3.002  33       14.39        2.946 33        14.39       2.946
Overall 
(Period 2)
270      15.10         3.429 93      15.11          3.714  90       15.83        3.598 87        14.34       2.735
Flat-wage 
(Period 3)
270      13.94         4.284 93       13.51         3.846  90       14.95        4.815 87        13.35       3.997
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Table 2.3 Correct Answers (Effective Effort)
Overall
 N    Mean  Std.Dev.
Voting
 N    Mean  Std.Dev.
 Authority 
 N    Mean  Std.Dev.   
Control
  N    Mean  Std.Dev.
Flat-wage 
(Period1)
270   10.30    3.148   93   10.50   3.154   90   10.59      3.613 87    9.79    2.543
Tournament 
(Period2)
168   12.67   3.865    57   12.84   4.161   57   13.47      4.004 54   11.64   3.169
Rev Sharing 
(Period2)
102   11.14   2.939    36   10.94   2.562   33   11.54      2.937 33   10.96   3.349
Overall 
(Period2)
270   12.09    3.615     93   12.11   3.728   90   12.76      3.751 87   11.39    3.236
Flat-wage 
(Period3)
270   10.81    4.074   93   10.62   3.715   90   11.69      4.585 87   10.13    3.753
The top row in both tables 2.2 and 2.3 report summary performance levels 
in Period 1 in all treatments (overall), and by treatment.  We interpret the level of 
effort provided in Period 1, where all subjects were compensated via a flat-wage 
contract, as a reasonable measure of ability and/or a willingness of subjects to 
provide effort in the absence extrinsic incentives.  Where many empirical papers 
in labor economics rely on the use of proxy measures for unobservable ability 
levels, a major benefit of our experimental design is that we are able to collect an 
observation of baseline ability for subjects performing this precise real-effort task, 
which will become key in subsequent analysis.  Standard parametric tests 
reported in Appendix A (A1 and A2) suggest that there are no differences in 
mean total attempted questions in Period 1 across treatments (p = .1097) or in 
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correct answers across treatments in Period 1 (p =  .1821).  This indicates that to 
the extent college-aged subjects had heterogeneous abilities in solving simple 
addition problems, our randomization procedure successfully distributed these 
characteristics across treatment groups.7  
Figure 2.1:  Column Graph of Total Effort and Correct Answers in all 
Treatments and Periods
Before solving math problems in Period 2, subjects were randomly and 
anonymously assigned to groups of three.  The determination of how they would 
be compensated in Period 2 was done endogenously by vote, endogenously by a 
single-decision maker in the group, or by a random exogenous process.  F-tests 
evaluating equivalence of mean performance across decision-making treatments 
is rejected overall among subjects in Period 2 for correct answers (p = .0400) and 
7 Random assignment of subjects from our subject pool to treatment occurred prior to the experiment 
being run.
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total attempts (p = .0150), as well as in Period 3 for correct answers (p = 0.0323) 
and total attempts (p = 0.0220).  
2.4.2 Regression analysis
In the following section, we present regression analysis to provide a more 
thorough examination of whether the process of implementation of the 
compensation contract at the outset of Period 2 can explain divergence in effort 
offered in Period 2 performance measures.  Our data we meet the Gauss-Markov 
criteria (with minor heteroscedasticity) therefore justifying the use of OLS with 
robust standard errors.
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                Table 2.4:  Dependent Variable Total Attempted Questions in Period 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
voting 0.763 0.777 1.864** 1.813** 0.896*
(0.484) (0.473) (0.884) (0.863) (0.515)
authority 1.489*** 1.466*** 1.819*** 1.851*** 0.931***
(0.479) (0.464) (0.535) (0.532) (0.314)
tournament 1.793*** 1.509*** 1.386*** 0.788***
(0.393) (0.397) (0.389) (0.264)
tourn_preference -0.708 -0.671 -0.641
(0.803) (0.780) (0.456)
revshar_preference -1.641** -1.207 -0.649
(0.815) (0.810) (0.466)
male 1.217*** 0.626***
(0.403) (0.241)
total1 0.852***
(0.0456)
Constant 14.34*** 13.23*** 13.41*** 12.79*** 3.107***
(0.293) (0.381) (0.382) (0.454) (0.614)
Observations 270 270 270 270 270
R-squared 0.031 0.095 0.109 0.138 0.695
                Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variable in all regression specifications in Table 2.4 
evaluates the number of total answers provided in Period 2, or what we refer to 
as effort.  In Regression (1), the reference category is comprised of subjects in the 
Control treatment, where their compensation scheme in Period 2 was 
implemented by an exogenous random process.  As one can see, subjects in the 
Authority treatment attempted an average of 1.489 questions more than those in 
the Control treatment, and this difference is significant at the .01 level.  The sign 
on the coefficient for Voting is positive, but the increase in the level of effort in 
Voting is not statistically significant relative to the Control.  A two tail t-test 
evaluating whether Voting and Authority coefficients were equal, is rejected (p 
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= .1486).  
The second regression specification adds an indicator variable of the 
compensation scheme implemented in Period 2 as a control.  This specification 
assumes that the effect of the compensation scheme is constant across all 
treatments, and more importantly for the purposes of our investigation, that 
mean effort differences that arise from our treatments are constant across 
compensation schemes.  Regression 2 shows that tournament contracts, 
irrespective of the manner they are implemented, result in higher levels of effort 
than the revenue sharing contract.  This is not an unexpected finding, but one 
that serves as a general robustness check to the experimental literature where 
tournament typically result in higher efforts in the lab.8  In Regression 2 we 
further notice that the coefficients and robust standard errors for both the 
Authority and Voting treatments are essentially unchanged from Regression 1. 
That is, subjects that had their compensation scheme implemented by a single 
group member in the Authority treatment on average attempted more questions 
than the Control in Period 2, after controlling for the compensation scheme 
selection.  
The specification in Regression 3 examines whether the difference in effort 
8 See Harbring and Irlunbush (2005) for a very useful survey evaluating effort under different 
tournament specifications in the lab.
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demonstrated in the treatments with endogenous selection in Period 2 is 
explained by their ability to voice a specific preference in the decision-making 
process.  Notice that all participants in the Voting treatment and the randomly 
selected member in the Authority treatment had the opportunity to express their 
preferences over how they would like their group to be compensated in Period 2. 
In Regression 3, we include indicator variables for the expressed preferences of 
each person with decision-making power in the Authority and Voting 
treatments.  Interestingly, we first notice negative signs on the coefficients 
suggesting that individuals with decision-making power had lower output than 
those without decision-making power.  Specifically, the regression suggests that a 
marginal increase in the number of subjects that expressed a preference for the 
revenue sharing contract was associated with decrease of 1.641 fewer total 
attempted answers on average in Period 2 and that this is significant at the .05 
level.  While there are a number of interesting reasons why subjects may express 
a preference for one compensation scheme over another, (i.e. a desire to free-ride 
on others, competition averse, inequality averse, a desire to compete, etc) the 
data collected herein do not allow for a thorough analysis to understand the 
precise motivations for why subjects expressed the preferences they did.9  
9 In Appendix C, we show that the specifications for Regression 3 as well as the Regressions 4 and 5 are 
not being driven by differences between subjects with decision-making power and without decision-
making power.  
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Nevertheless, in the third regression specification in Table 2.4 we find 
evidence suggesting that democratic procedures in the Voting treatment are 
associated with increased effort for all expressed preferences after controlling for 
the compensation scheme.  Similarly, groups that had their compensation scheme 
decided by a single group member (the Authority treatment) also demonstrate an 
increase in effort for all expressed preferences and compensation schemes. 
Under this specification, the increased effect of voting on effort is significant at 
the .05 level and the increase in effort from groups that had a single decision-
maker is significant at the .01 level.  Taken together, the results under this 
specification suggest that the success of a compensation scheme in influencing 
performance can be different when imposed by a process external to a group, 
rather than when it is imposed by an endogenous decision-making process.  
Because of the well-known literature that has shown gendered attitudes 
towards competition (e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)), and performance 
differences in competitive environments to be sensitive to gender (e.g. Gneezy et 
al. (2003)), the regression specification in Column 4 of Table 2.4 includes a control 
variable for gender.  We find that on average, men in the second period provided 
more effort than women, but more importantly for the purposes of our 
investigation, after controlling for gender, compensation scheme, and expressed 
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preferences, the treatments with endogenous selection procedures continue to 
account for significant differences in performance.  
Finally, in Regression 5 we include a control variable of subject ability. 
Our ability measure uses the performance of subjects in Period 1 of the 
experiment.  Perhaps the main advantage of using an experimental design over a 
tradition empirical design to study worker performance is that in the lab we are 
able to collect an observable measure of ability for a specific production task in the 
absence of extrinsic incentives.  Indeed, a traditional weakness of many labor 
economics papers examining the effects of different institutional features on 
performance is not having a measure of performance, and hence having to resort 
to constructing proxy measures of ability and/or relying on econometric 
techniques that can be loaded with strong implicit behavioral assumptions to 
control for unobservable characteristics.  Our data set provide a baseline measure 
of ability for subjects, which we use in Regression 5.  
One might expect that individuals with higher demonstrated ability in 
Period 1 would perform at higher levels in Period 2 after controlling for 
compensation scheme, decision-making treatment, gender, and expressed 
preference, and our findings in Regression 5 are consistent with this intuition. 
Moreover, we find evidence that after including the additional control measure 
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of ability, the decision-control right arrangement strongly influences the level of 
performance in Period 2 with members in the Authority treatment displaying an 
average increase of 0.93 total attempted questions relative to the Control which is 
significant at the 0.01 level, and subjects in the Voting treatment displaying an 
average increase in performance of 0.896 total attempted questions relative to the 
Control, which is statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  In sum, Regression 5 
shows that endogenous decision processes that result the imposition of the 
compensation contract result in higher performance than an exogenous contract 
imposition after controlling for ability, compensation scheme, gender, and the 
expressed preferences of subjects.
In Table 2.5 (shown below), we conduct the same 5 regression 
specifications that were run on total effort in Table 3, but we change the 
dependent variable from total attempted questions to total correct answers in Period 
2 to evaluate effective effort.  As one can see, our findings reported in Table 2.5 are 
consistent with the qualitative and quantitative story that arises from Table 2.4 
with few exceptions.  Most importantly, Table 2.5 again shows that members in 
the Authority treatment display a higher level of effort in Period 2 across all 
regression specifications at the .01 level of significance than the reference 
categories, again suggesting that the process of implementation has an effect on 
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performance even after controlling for compensation scheme, expressed 
preferences for those with decision-making power, gender, and our baseline 
ability measure.     
                 Table 2.5:  Dependent Variable Correct Answers in Period 2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
voting 0.717 0.729 2.266** 2.221** 1.095*
(0.519) (0.513) (0.936) (0.920) (0.588)
authority 1.376*** 1.357*** 1.860*** 1.889*** 1.075***
(0.526) (0.518) (0.589) (0.586) (0.388)
tournament 1.514*** 1.226*** 1.117** 0.618*
(0.415) (0.443) (0.439) (0.346)
tourn_preference -1.152 -1.120 -1.024**
(0.836) (0.815) (0.505)
revshar_preference -2.100** -1.714** -0.595
(0.857) (0.856) (0.535)
male 1.083** 0.813**
(0.437) (0.315)
correct1 0.808***
(0.0559)
Constant 11.39*** 10.45*** 10.63*** 10.08*** 2.629***
(0.347) (0.440) (0.451) (0.513) (0.676)
Observations 270 270 270 270 270
R-squared 0.024 0.065 0.084 0.104 0.569
                   Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.4.3 Period 3 Data
In both Period 1 and Period 3 subjects were compensated a flat-wage of 75 
EUs to solve addition problems for 5 minutes.  Notice that subjects do not receive 
any marginal benefit for each correctly solved math problem and there are no 
consequences for shirking.  Nevertheless subjects engaged in production in both 
Period 1 and Period 3 attempting an average of 12.75 and 13.94 questions 
respectively (effort).  Similarly subjects answering an average of 10.30 and 10.81 
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questions correctly (effective effort) in Period 1 and Period 3 respectively.  Our 
study was designed to test if different implementation processes at the outset of 
Period 2 affected effort in Period 2, but the additional data gathered in Period 3 
are useful for at least 2 reasons.  First, they allow for a test of crowding effects 
which we examine more thoroughly in Appendix E, but more importantly for the 
present analysis, Period 3 provide an additional observation of ability along with 
Period 1 data.10  When we try regression specifications that include Period 3 data, 
we find that the qualitative results from the previous section do not significantly 
change.    
Specifically, Regression 1 in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 shown below 
reproduce Regression 5 in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5.  Regression 2 in both tables 
includes Period 3 data instead of Period 1 data as a measure of ability, and 
Regression 3 in both tables includes both Period 1 and Period 3 data as control 
variables.  
The results in Tables 2.6 show that the treatment effect of Voting becomes 
10 An alternative interpretation of the data collected in Period 3, however, is that they measure the 
willingness to provide effort in the absence of any extrinsic incentives-- or their intrinsic motivation for 
performing the production task.  Notice that at the beginning of Period 1, subjects had no prior 
experience with the specific production task used for the duration of the experiment but by Period 3 the 
subjects had 10 minutes of experience and they were also told that their compensation would be 
identical to the compensation received in Period 1 (a flat-wage payment of 75 EUs).  The data in Period 
3 further allow us an opportunity to study if the experience of the experiment led to any systematic 
increases or decreases in effort.  An econometric exercise shown in Appendix E suggests that the 
conditions of the experiment did not contribute to any crowding-in or out in Period 3.  We do find, 
however, that that past success in production contributed to more effective effort in Period 3.  
36
even stronger when including the Period 3 data than reported in Tables 2.4.  All 
other co-variates remain largely unchanged with the incorporation of Period 3 
data into the regression analysis.                    
                                  
          Table 2.6:  Dependent Variable Total Attempted Questions in Period 2
(Period 3 Data)
(1) (2) (3)
voting 0.896* 1.752*** 1.104**
(0.515) (0.587) (0.443)
authority 0.931*** 0.968** 0.756***
(0.314) (0.378) (0.268)
tournament 0.788*** 1.010*** 0.766***
(0.264) (0.334) (0.253)
tourn_preference -0.641 -1.078** -0.839**
(0.456) (0.498) (0.381)
revshar_preference -0.649 -0.931* -0.663
(0.466) (0.558) (0.419)
male 0.626*** 0.416 0.404*
(0.241) (0.292) (0.218)
total1 0.852*** 0.632***
(0.0456) (0.0498)
total3 0.550*** 0.258***
(0.0582) (0.0432)
Constant 3.107*** 6.131*** 2.490***
(0.614) (0.728) (0.639)
Observations 270 270 270
R-squared 0.695 0.567 0.752
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
It should be noted that Period 1 data and Period 3 data are not statistically 
equivalent to one another (see Appendix D).  Using two-tailed paired t-tests, we 
reject the hypothesis of equivalence of means between Period 3 and Period 1 total 
attempted questions (p = 0.01) and also correct answers (p = 0.01).  Our data 
unfortunately do not allow us to cleanly infer why Period 3 effort was higher than 
in Period 1.  Perhaps Period 3 effort was higher than Period 1 effort because 1) 
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subjects had more practice with the specific production task, or possibly because 
2) subjects did not feel any pressure to perform since they were not going to be 
paid through an incentive contract.11
Turning now to how the inclusion of Period 3 data affects performance 
measured by effective effort, we again notice that the qualitative story does not 
change much compared to Table 2.5.  In Regression 2 of Table 2.7 we do see a 
large increase on the Voting coefficient but when we include both Period 3 and 
Period 1 data in Regression 3, we arrive to the same qualitative conclusions as in 
Table 2.5.  Specifically, after controlling for compensation scheme, ability, 
expressed preferences, and gender, groups with endogenous rule creation 
performed at significantly higher levels than the control group with exogenous 
rule creation.             
                 
11 Cognitive psychologists that suggest that pressure reduces the working memory capacity available for 
skill execution.  For example, an experiment conducted by Beilock and Carr (2005), shows that only 
individuals high in working memory capacity were harmed by performance pressure when solving math 
problems, and, furthermore, these skill decrements were limited to math problems with the highest 
demands on working memory capacity. The authors suggest that that performance pressure harms 
individuals most qualified to succeed by consuming the working memory capacity that they rely on for 
their superior performance.  
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                 Table 2.7:  Dependent Variable Correct Answers in Period 2
(Period 3 Data) 
(1) (2) (3)
voting 1.095* 1.936*** 1.281**
(0.588) (0.692) (0.530)
authority 1.075*** 0.977** 0.822**
(0.388) (0.422) (0.341)
tournament 0.618* 0.536 0.451
(0.346) (0.358) (0.328)
tourn_preference -1.024** -1.373** -1.192***
(0.505) (0.626) (0.457)
revshar_preference -0.595 -1.545** -0.843*
(0.535) (0.628) (0.494)
male 0.813** 0.493 0.571**
(0.315) (0.333) (0.289)
correct1 0.808*** 0.562***
(0.0559) (0.0587)
correct3 0.581*** 0.319***
(0.0540) (0.0503)
Constant 2.629*** 4.891*** 2.052***
(0.676) (0.656) (0.644)
Observations 270 270 270
R-squared 0.569 0.502 0.645
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
                 
2.4.4 Quantile Regression
Our analysis up to now has employed conventional least squares 
regression which evaluate the various effects of our covariates on the conditional 
mean performance (measured either via total answers, or correct answers) in 
Period 2.  In order to provide a more complete picture of the covariate effects 
across the performance distribution of subjects we also provide estimates of the 
conditional quantile regressions shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 below to illustrate 
possible heterogeneous treatment effects.  Figure 2.2 shows quantile estimates for 
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total effort, and Figure 2.3 for correct answers.  All graphs are bounded at the 20th 
and 80th quantiles in both figures because of the relatively small number of 
observations in those quantiles.  In an effort to be consistent with previous 
regression analyses, we summarize quantile regression on the same seven 
covariates evaluated in the 5th columns of our linear regression specifications 
shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.  At any chosen quantile for a given covariate, the 
graphs provide point estimates of the impact of a one-unit change of the 
covariate on performance in Period 2 at each quantile holding the other 
covariates fixed.    
While the quantile regressions do not reveal strong evidence suggesting 
heterogeneous effects, we do note some potentially interesting and informative 
qualitative phenomena.  Specifically, the second panel in the first row of both 
figures 2.2 and 2.3 shows the effect of being in the Voting treatments for each 
performance quantile and this is evidence suggesting that higher performing 
subjects in the Voting treatment were more affected by the decision-making 
treatment than lower performing subjects.  We observe a similar result when 
comparing subjects in the tournament with those in the revenue sharing contract 
(first panel in the second row of both figures).  That is, higher performing 
subjects in the tournament contract performed at a higher level than high 
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performing subjects in the revenue sharing contract.  
Figure 2.2:  Quantile Regression Estimates for Total Answers in Period 2
Effective effort in Figure 2.3 falls off quite sharply for quantiles above .70 
but total effort in Figure 2.2 does not.  This may indicate that high performing 
subjects were trying to maintain a high level of performance to win the 
tournament, but were doing so at the cost of quality performance.  Indeed a 
typical finding in the experimental economics literature shows that the variance 
of effort under tournament compensation schemes is usually much higher than 
what is theoretically predicted.  This particular pattern has been noted in chosen 
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effort lab experiments (Bull et al. (1987)), real effort experiments of van Dijk et al. 
(2001), and the field experiments conducted in Shearer (2004).  The 
heterogeneous effects shown in our analysis do not offer much of an explanation 
for why there is high variation in tournament schemes, but they do suggest some 
hypotheses that could be tested with a different design.  For example, it may be 
that high-performers become reckless in tournaments and low performers, 
knowing that they are relatively weaker are not much affected by tournament 
schemes relative to say, piece-rates.  
Figure 2.3:  Quantile Regression Estimates for Correct Answers in Period 2
Finally, when we compare the corresponding performances in Period 2 by 
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gender, we observe that at all quantiles, men performed at a higher level than 
women given the specification of the other conditioning variables in both Figure 
2.2. and Figure 2.3. 
2.5 Conclusion
With few exceptions, the economics literature has overlooked how 
procedural aspects in the determination of rules and institutions affect behavior. 
We've shown that participants in a real-effort laboratory experiment subjected to 
an identical set of wage incentives either implemented (1) endogenously by the 
group to which subjects belong through a simple majority vote, (2) endogenously 
by only one member of the group who had all decision-control rights, or (3) a 
random process completely exogenous to the group, systematically performed at 
different levels even after controlling for gender, the ability to voice a preference 
for a compensation scheme, and a measure of demonstrated ability.  Specifically, 
we found strong statistical evidence that different levels of effort were provided 
under endogenous imposition schemes relative to the random exogenous 
processes.  These findings are robust to alternative regression specifications that 
include two separate measures of ability.  Furthermore, quantile regression 
analysis showed that some of these treatment effects were heterogeneous across 
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the performance distribution with higher performing subjects in the Voting 
treatment more affected by 'voting' than low performing subjects in the same 
treatment, relative to the Control.  
By showing that the process by which a material incentive was 
implemented partially explains differences in performance, we add further 
credence to recent claims in economics (and well established claims in many 
related social sciences) that procedural aspects cannot be separated from how 
individuals interpret material incentives (e.g. Frey and Stutzer (2004)).  This 
research raises many more questions than provides definite answers.  To what do 
we attribute the differences in the interpretation of incentives that are materially 
identical?  Would we expect to observe similar results if the decision-maker in 
the Authority treatment was determined by a non-random process?  Does the 
process of implementation matter more or less if subjects were given a different 
effort task, or given the opportunity to select out of the effort task?  While much 
is left unresolved, we believe that the issues we touch upon in this paper are ripe 
for further exploration.
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CHAPTER 3
THE RELATIVE EFFECT OF EMPLOYEE VOICE, AUTONOMY, 
AND WAGES ON JOB SATISFACTION 
3.1 Introduction
In the following paper we analyze the relative effects of voice, autonomy, 
and wages in explaining job satisfaction.  While job satisfaction has been 
identified as an important economic variable because of its association with 
lower absenteeism, (Wegge et al., (2007)) quits, (e.g. Freeman, 1978), and positive 
association with work behavior that extends beyond perfunctory standards 
(Organ and Ryan, (1995)), job satisfaction is still a relatively “new” subject of 
interest within Economics.  By contrast, in both Organizational Behavior and 
Management Studies job satisfaction is one of the most investigated variables 
(Cranny et al. 1992, Spector 1997).  Daniel Hamermesh (2004) likens the recent 
uptick in the interest of satisfaction studies in economics as partly a function of 
the “Mt. Everest phenomenon” or the mountain of extensive, potentially 
interesting, attitudinal data that should be explored.12  The increase in behavioral 
considerations within economics, however, has also contributed to a general 
12 For examples of seminal papers by economists on job satisfaction as an economic variable, See 
Hamermesh (1977) and Freeman (1978).  Frey and Stutzer (2002) provides an excellent review of 
subjective evaluation studies for questions economists are traditionally study.
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expansion of the scope of questions that are studied by economists – including 
job satisfaction.  This new trend has affected the framework of analysis.  The 
rational choice model (RCM) has been central in traditional economic evaluations 
of personnel and human resources issues in the firm (e.g. incentives, 
compensation, and job search) but it is increasingly recognized that the RCM 
may have several shortcomings.
First, within the RCM all agents are assumed to act in the pursuit of their 
own private interest which has led to the ubiquitous assumption that utility 
maximizing workers conceptualize 'work' as a private cost and will therefore 
have a natural tendency to shirk.  We know, however, that workers draw upon 
their employment as a source of utility through various avenues – including the 
social interaction they have with co-workers, feelings of accomplishment, the 
associated social status of work, or simply from performing the work task itself 
(Frey and Stutzer (2002)).  Both Lane (1991) and Juster (1991), furthermore, find 
that most people rate 'satisfying work' as more important to explaining personal 
happiness than income, material possessions, and most forms of leisure.  Other 
studies show that the psychic costs endured during a of a spell of unemployment 
typically include anxiety, loss in self-esteem, and depression (e.g. Argyle, 1989).  
Second, within the RCM it is assumed that 1) preferences are revealed 
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through choices, 2) the revealed preferences are those that maximize utility, and 
3) preferences are consistent through all points in time (Read, (2007)).  Hundreds 
of studies, however, show that humans often 'reveal choices' that would be 
inconsistent with utility maximization within the RCM.  For example, we know 
that 'real-world' individuals use cognitive heuristics that can lead to systematic 
errors when evaluating probabilistic events (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)), 
they regularly demonstrate time-inconsistent preferences, (e.g. Thaler, (1981), 
Laibson, (1997)), and that the hedonic effect of favorable and unfavorable 
circumstances adjusts through time (e.g. Frederick and Loewenstein (1999)).  In 
consideration of these and other behavioral issues that conflict with the RCM 
framework, Daniel Kahneman (e.g. Kahneman et al. (1997), Kahneman et al., 
(1999), Kahneman and Sugden, (2005)), and others have advocated for the use of 
experience utility – or the utility as gained through experiencing a set of 
circumstances that one lives through, in addition to decision utility – or the utility 
gained when revealing exogenously given preferences, to evaluate outcomes. 
Consistent with the concept of experience utility, we conceptualize self-reported 
levels of job satisfaction as a reflection of an attitude that a worker has in 
consideration of their job characteristics after having gained some experience 
with their work.  In particular, we investigate the relative impact of job 
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characteristics that allow workers autonomy and voice using subjective 
evaluations of work conditions and satisfaction recorded in the 2004 wave of the 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS).  
The 2004 WERS includes a variety of questions that depict attitudinal and 
subjective evaluations by workers of managers, other employees, and third party 
employee representatives, over a variety of employment relations issues.  Some 
financial data on the firm, including employee wages are also provided, and we 
use data on wages in addition to employees' subjective evaluation over the ability 
to control their own work and to influence firm level policy and organization.13 
We also draw upon data that has been made linkable to the 2004 WERS that 
provides selected characteristics of the local geographic area that the firm is 
located in, such as the local unemployment rate.  
Using survey responses, we find that the wage is positively correlated 
with job satisfaction; but when measures of worker autonomy and voice are 
13 Subjective evaluation surveys, while are not without 'noise' that can arise from various factors (i.e. 
mood bias, response biases) offer the most widely used approach for studying satisfaction and are the 
method that we employ. (See Frey and Stutzer (2002) for a general review subjective evaluation studies 
in economics.  Kahneman and Sugden (2005) do discuss potential alternatives to measuring experience 
utility that have been used including the experience sampling methodology where each subject is asked 
to carry a device that beeps at random times during the day, at which time the subject is asked to 
respond to questions regarding her current situation and affective state.  They also describe the day 
reconstruction method where subjects are asked to think about their previous day, decompose it into 
short ‘episodes’ such as ‘having dinner’ or ‘traveling to the gym’ and then, for each episode, to note if 
she was interacting with anyone and to describe how her affective state (for example, ‘happy’, ‘enjoying 
myself’, ‘frustrated/annoyed’, ‘worried/ anxious’).  The day reconstruction method is thought to reduce 
the vulnerability of subjective measurements that might arise due to focusing illusions – or the tendency 
to exaggerate the importance of the current focus of one’s attention, because it does not prompt people 
to think about particular sources of happiness or unhappiness. Instead, respondents evaluate the overall 
affective experience of different episodes, whose boundaries they define for themselves. 
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included in the satisfaction regression, the magnitude of the coefficient on the 
wage decreases by a factor of 3.  The elasticity of satisfaction with respect to 
autonomy and voice, respectively, is 12 to 15 times larger than the elasticity with 
respect to the wage.  The inclusion of autonomy and voice further causes a spike 
in explaining the proportion of variability of job satisfaction.  For instance, the 
Adjusted  R2 spikes from 0.093 to 0.476 when including measures of autonomy 
and voice (F-tests comparing specifications significantly differ at the 0.01 level). 
Thus, autonomy and voice both appear to trump the wage in determining job 
satisfaction.  We conclude that, conditional upon having a job, the amount of 
control a worker has is an important determinant of job satisfaction.14  Our 
findings suggest that while wages are an important determinant of which job an 
individual would select into, it is not the most important determinant of job 
satisfaction (experience utility); particularly when compared to autonomy and 
employee voice.
3.2 Background
14 This is cross-section data and occupation fixed effects are used.  All identification comes from variation 
across existing workers in a given occuaption
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3.2.1 Employee voice and autonomy
In a general sense, employee voice refers to the idea that workers can 
express their interests and concerns over firm matters to management in a 
meaningful manner.  The precise meaning of the term, however, and the 
rationale for its application varies along different economic, moral, and 
pragmatic dimensions.15  For example, Hirshman (1970) conceptualizes 'voice' in 
a firm as employee access to grievance procedures, while others expand on the 
term for it to refer to the level of influence employees have in development of all 
firm rules and policies ranging from payment, to work schedules, investment 
decisions, and production processes (e.g. McCabe and Lewin (1992); Huselid 
(1995)).  Although collective bargaining and/or trade unionism have historically 
been the primary mechanisms for the representation of worker interests, 
initiatives designed to increase employee involvement have increasingly featured 
in the prescriptive management literature for both unionized and nonunion 
workers over the past 50 years.16   
Similarly, the literature on worker autonomy contains many definitions 
15 Dundon et al. (2004) provide an excellent taxonomic scheme of how voice has been conceptualized in 
different literatures.
16  This is particularly true in Europe where nonunion workers can legitimately have formal voice 
regarding their working conditions supported by the EU Directives on European Works Councils 
(EWCs) and Employee Information and Consultation.  While many petitions and political movements 
supportive of similar legislation exist in the U.S. such as the Workplace Bill of Right campaign 
(http://www.workplacefairness.org/workplace-bill-of-rights ) similar legislation has yet to be introduced 
in the U.S.  Bowles and Gintis (1996) further comment on the notion that democratic processes within 
firms are not redundant within a liberal democratic polity.
50
and interpretations of the precise meaning of the term.  While some definitions 
are used to interpret potential influences on the worker's work practice, others 
are used to guide research about the organizational features of the firm.   For the 
purposes of the research conducted herein, and in conjunction with the 2004 
WERS, we define autonomy as the ability of a worker to use her own knowledge 
to make decisions that directly affect her work.  
3.2.2 Prescriptive Human Resource Management
The prescriptive management and organizational behavior literature is 
full of superlative hypotheses describing virtuous cascades that follow from 
providing workers with more autonomy and voice, including higher job 
satisfaction.  The empirical record on these issues is at least as old as scientific 
management, but most studies have been restricted to case studies on a small 
number of firms.  The quality and extent of large-scale micro attitudinal data on 
the topic are a recent phenomenon.  The bulk of studies on voice and autonomy, 
moreover, focus on the effects of specific organizational mechanisms (such as 
joint consultation or works councils) on job satisfaction.  While there is surely 
overlap between employee voice, autonomy, and the firm policies designed to 
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foster them, we instead use workers' subjective evaluation of the level of voice 
and autonomy that they have in the firm.  This approach allows us to engage 
with the issues of voice and autonomy on general terms rather than focusing on 
any specific management or human resources paradigm.17  
3.2.3 Similar Attitudinal Data
The emergence of large micro data sets linking individuals to particular 
types of work organization structures is recent.  Appelbaum et al. (2000) survey 
workers in apparel, steel, medical electronics, and imaging industries in the U.S. 
finding that “high-performance workplace practices” that introduce work teams 
and rely more on participatory decision-making have many virtuous effects. 
They report increases in workers' trust in their managers, higher intrinsic 
motivation, increases in job satisfaction, and also in organizational commitment. 
They further find that the added responsibility that comes with these 
organizational structures does not negatively affect workers' stress.  In general, 
17 While not entirely intractable, the management literature offers various prescriptive frameworks that 
overlap significantly with respect to management practices.  For example, one can find significant 
literatures on Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM), Human Resource Management (HRM), 
High Commitment Management (HCM), High Performance Management (HPM), High Involvement 
Management (HIM), High Performance Workplace Practices (HPWP), High Performance Work 
Systems (WPWS), High Involvement Work Design (HIWD), Total Quality Management (TQM) among 
(many) others that are different, yet al.l make claims over the importance of advancing employee voice 
and autonomy.  
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the positive effects of participation and work teams on job satisfaction are 
corroborated in the analysis of the U.S. based Workplace Representation and 
Participation Survey (WRPS) reported in Freeman and Rogers (1999), and 
Freeman and Kleiner (2000), the European Survey on Working Conditions 
(ESWC) as reported in Bauer (2004), data collected by the Institute of Work 
Psychology reported in Stride et al. (2007), and also in many firm level case 
studies (e.g. Lawler and Hall;  (1970); (Bjork et al. 2007).  A survey conducted in 
Godard (2001), however, suggests increasing levels of participatory workplace 
strategies can weaken and in some cases decrease job satisfaction because of new 
pressures and responsibilities that accompany participation.  Similar findings 
have been reported in Batt and Applelbaum (1995), Graham (1995), and Lewchuk 
and Robertson (1997). 18  
Our own study is similar to Wood (2008) because of the use of subjective 
evaluation data measuring voice and satisfaction taken from the 2004 wave of the 
Workplace Employee Relations Survey.  The emphasis of Wood's piece is in 
showing the importance of job characteristics for researchers interested in 
analyzing job satisfaction.  Our study, by contrast investigates the relative effects 
of voice and autonomy, compared to the wage in explaining job satisfaction.  
18 For example, see the edited volume by Freeman, Boxall, and Haynes (2007) for descriptive summaries 
of various attitudinal surveys that build upon survey work conducted in Freeman and Rogers (1999). 
Studies from data collected from the WPRS, BWRPS,  AWRPS, NZWRPS, NCPP/ESRI/UCD, Canada-
U.S. Labor Attitudes Survey, and WERS are presented. 
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Economists are relatively new to studying job satisfaction, and have 
largely ignored the importance of job characteristics.  To be fair, Lazear (1996) 
mentions that economists have dealt with the study of job characteristics that 
operate outside of the price system “quite easily” by transforming nonpecuniary 
components of the job into their monetary equivalents by equalizing differences 
or “compensating differentials” (e.g. Rosen 1974).  Lazear, however, is quick to 
point out the “fundamental identification problem” that occurs if workers with 
exogenous preferences sort according to ability, making it difficult to pick up the 
trade-off between wages and job characteristics independent of ability.   Of 
course, the theory of compensating differentials is rooted in the RCM, which, as 
we have illustrated above, may be problematic in and of itself.  
3.3 Data
The data come from the worker, management, and geographic files of the 
2004 wave of the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) sponsored and 
collected by the Department of Trade and Industry, ACAS, the Economic and 
Social Research Council, and the Policy Studies Studies Institute.  The WERS 
survey is a nationally representative, stratified, random-sample of United 
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Kingdom workplaces with at least 10 employees.  The survey samples no more 
than 25 employees from a given firm and there are approximately 2300 
workplaces and 22,500 employees in the 2004 WERS.  
The final subsample of the data set used here contains 15,547 observations. 
There are two main sources of missing observations.  The first source is unusable 
responses to questions about earnings, where an unusable response is either a 
non-response or one where the worker did not know her income.  The second 
main source is non-responses to questions about the various aspects of worker 
autonomy and voice.  
3.4 Methodology
Autonomy is a measure of the worker's ability to control her own job, and 
voice is a measure of the ability of a worker to influence the firm as a whole via 
communication with management. The questions regarding satisfaction, 
autonomy, voice, effort, and job security are all coded according to a Likert scale 
with 1 being ``strongly disagree'' and 5 ``strongly agree.''  Thus, higher numbers 
mean greater satisfaction, greater autonomy, greater voice, and greater job 
security, respectively. 
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                                     Table 3.1:  Summary Statistics of Key Variables
                           Statistic         Satisfaction     Autonomy      Voice      Wage
                            Mean                 24.46                14.97          12.26       10.42
                            Std. Dev            (4.88)               (3.65)          (3.91)      (5.77)
Source:  Authors' calculations based on the 2004 Workplace Employee Relations Survey.
Notes:  Index of autonomy is the sum of 5 aspects of workplace autonomy, and varies
 between 5 and 25.  Index of satisfaction is the sum of seven aspects of job satisfaction,
and varies between 7 and 35.  The wage is calculated by taking usual weekly income and
 dividing it by usual weekly work hours.
Table 3.1 contains summary statistics of the four key variables: job 
satisfaction, autonomy, voice, and the wage.  Except for the wage, the key 
variables are all captured by multiple questions in the WERS survey.  We 
combined the respective questions on  satisfaction, voice, and autonomy into 
indexes.  These indexes represent the overall level of satisfaction, voice, and 
autonomy that workers report having in the workplace.  The three indexes are 
constructed through summation of the responses to the relevant questions.19 
There are seven questions on job satisfaction covering satisfaction with 
achievement, initiative, influence, training, pay, job security, and the work itself. 
The survey covers five aspects of autonomy: control over the tasks to be 
completed, the pace tasks are completed, how tasks are to be completed, the 
19 The results of a PCA on the 7 satisfaction questions suggested 6 orthogonal components.  We therefore 
found it reasonable to construct an index using simple summation.  In subsequent analysis, we took the 
logs of all variables for comparison of coefficients without units.
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order in which tasks are completed, and daily start and/or stop time.  Finally, 
there are four aspects of voice: the extent to which management solicits views 
from workers, how responsive management is to the suggestions of employees, 
how good managers are at letting employees and/or employee representatives 
influence final decisions, and overall satisfaction with the amount of employee 
involvement there is in workplace decision making.  The precise questions used 
are listed in Appendix F.  The three indexes--job satisfaction, autonomy and 
voice--vary between 7 and 35, 5 and 25, and 4 and 20, respectively.
The primary justification for using indexes constructed in this manner is 
simplicity for both presentation and interpretation of the results.  There is, 
however, an important conceptual justification for the indexes, particularly the 
index of job satisfaction.  The questions covering job satisfaction are intended to 
cover aspects of satisfaction that can vary independently of each other to paint 
more complete picture of job satisfaction.  We find it reasonable to think of the 
sum of the seven aspects as representing overall satisfaction.  Of course, for a 
given level of overall job satisfaction, this construction obscures important 
variation across individuals. 
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                                     Figure 3.1:  Plot of Overall Satisfaction over Autonomy
Source:  Authors' calculations based on the 2004 Workplace Employee Relations Survey.
Notes:  Index of autonomy is the sum of 5 aspects of workplace autonomy, and varies
 between 5 and 25.  Index of satisfaction is the sum of seven aspects of job satisfaction,
 and varies between 7 and 35. 
                                  Figure 3.2:  Plot of Overall Satisfaction over Voice
Source:  Authors' calculations based on the 2004 Workplace Employee Relations Survey.
Notes:  Index of voice  is the sum of four aspects of voice, and varies between 4 and 20.
Index of satisfaction is the sum of seven aspects of job satisfaction, and varies between 7
and 35. 
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The central hypothesis that job satisfaction increases with the amount of 
autonomy and voice a worker has over the workplace is illustrated in Figures 3.1 
and Figure 3.2. There is a strong positive correlation between satisfaction and 
both autonomy and voice, respectively.  Consistent with Wood (2008), the figures 
demonstrate the importance of the relationship between these two job attributes 
and job satisfaction.  However, there are likely important correlates of job 
satisfaction that could reduce or eliminate the correlation between job 
satisfaction and voice and autonomy, respectively.  Most importantly, jobs with 
more autonomy likely pay more, implying that the strong positive correlation 
between job satisfaction and autonomy is picking up the effect of the wage as 
well as autonomy itself.  In the following section we investigate this issue further 
with regression analysis.
3.5 Estimation Results
The regression results can be found in Table 3.2.  The key variables of the 
analysis are the wage, the index of autonomy, and the index of voice.  The 
remaining control variables, common to all regressions include usual weekly 
work hours, and dummies for begin a supervisor, a union member, female, 
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married, a permanent employee, and a full-time employee.  All regressions also 
contain categorical variables for age, education, tenure, and race, as well as a set 
of occupation dummies.  All regressions are Log-OLS regressions, where the 
dependent variable is the index of job satisfaction.20 Standard errors are clustered 
on the firm.
20 Because of how the index is constructed, there is some clustering at the extreme values.  The results are 
robust to estimation with Tobit rather than OLS.
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Table 3.2:  Regression of Job Satisfaction on the Wage, Voice, and Autonomy
                                                      (1)               (2)              (3)              (4)                (5)                 (6)
log wage                                    0.050***      0.022***    0.036***    0.025***        0.019***                      
                                                    (0.007)        (0.005)      (0.006)      (0.006)          (0.006)                       
log autonomy                                               0.229***                      0.350***        0.215***       0.232***
                                                                        (0.008)                       (0.010)          (0.009)          (0.008)
log voice                                                        0.307***    0.356***                         0.319***        0.307*** 
                                                                        (0.006)      (0.007)                           (0.008)          (0.006)
supervisor                                 0.068***      0.014***    0.031***     0.034***       -0.075           0.017***
                                                    (0.005)        (0.004)      (0.004)       (0.004)         (0.056)         (0.004)
supervisor x wage                                                                                                 0.008                               
                                                                                                                                 (0.008)
supervisor x autonomy                                                                                        0.063***
                                                                                                                                 (0.019)                  
supervisor x voice                                                                                                 -0.041***                
                                                                                                                                 (0.012)             
union                                         -0.050***     -0.018***   -0.025***    -0.034***      -0.017***    -0.017***
                                                    (0.006)        (0.004)      (0.004)       (0.006)          (0.004)       (0.004)
female                                        0.040***      0.021***    0.026***     0.031***        0.022***      0.018***
                                                    (0.005)        (0.004)      (0.004)       (0.005)          (0.004)        (0.004)
hours                                          0.001***      0.001***    0.002***     0.001***        0.001***      0.001***
                                                    (0.000)        (0.000)      (0.000)       (0.000)          (0.000)        (0.000)
married                                      0.011**       0.007**      0.012***     0.005             0.007**       0.008**
                                                    (0.005)        (0.004)      (0.004)       (0.005)          (0.004)        (0.004) 
permanent                                 0.029***      0.030***    0.025***     0.035***        0.030***      0.030***
                                                    (0.009)        (0.007)      (0.007)       (0.008)          (0.007)        (0.007)
fulltime                                     -0.057***     -0.046***  -0.044***     -0.057***      -0.045***     -0.042***
                                                    (0.009)        (0.007)      (0.008)       (0.008)          (0.007)        (0.007)
Age
22-29                                          -0.026**      -0.020**    -0.021**      -0.024**        -0.019**       -0.017**     
                                                    (0.011)       (0.009)      (0.009)        (0.010)          (0.009)        (0.009)
30-39                                          -0.031***    -0.021**    -0.017*        -0.034***       -0.019**      -0.015  
                                                    (0.011)       (0.009)      (0.009)        (0.011)          (0.009)        (0.009)
40-49                                          -0.034***    -0.024**    -0.021**      -0.035***       -0.023**       -0.018*
                                                    (0.011)       (0.009)      (0.009)        (0.011)          (0.009)        (0.009)
50-59                                          -0.011         -0.007       -0.003         -0.016            -0.006          -0.002
                                                    (0.012)       (0.010)      (0.010)        (0.011)          (0.010)        (0.009)
60-65                                           0.060***      0.044***    0.057***     0.040***        0.045***      0.048***
                                                    (0.014)       (0.012)      (0.012)        (0.013)          (0.012)        (0.012)   
> 65                                             0.140***      0.054***    0.082***     0.086***        0.055***      0.056***
                                                    (0.024)        (0.016)     (0.018)        (0.021)          (0.017)        (0.017)     
Tenure
1-2 years                                    -0.029***    -0.000        0.004          -0.029***       0.001           -0.000
                                                    (0.009)       (0.006)      (0.006)        (0.008)          (0.006)        (0.006)
2-5 years                                    -0.045***    -0.006        0.001          -0.046***      -0.005           -0.005
                                                    (0.008)       (0.005)      (0.006)        (0.007)          (0.005)        (0.005)
5-10 years                                  -0.039***     0.001        0.010          -0.043***       0.003           0.002
                                                    (0.008)       (0.006)      (0.007)        (0.008)          (0.006)        (0.006) 
>= 10 years                                -0.047***    -0.006        0.007          -0.054***      -0.005           -0.004
                                                    (0.008)       (0.006)      (0.006)        (0.008)          (0.006)        (0.006)                                          
Education 
College degree                         -0.036***    -0.027***    -0.027***   -0.034***      -0.027***     -0.023***
                                                    (0.006)       (0.005)      (0.005)        (0.006)          (0.005)        (0.004)                                          
Advanced degree                    -0.035***    -0.018***    -0.011        -0.040***      -0.020***     -0.012*
                                                    (0.010)       (0.007)      (0.007)        (0.009)          (0.007)        (0.007)                                          
Constant                                    3.037***      1.729***    2.148***     2.210***        1.740***      1.762***
                                                    (0.037)       (0.036)      (0.034)        (0.041)          (0.040)        (0.036)        
N                                                 15650         15650        15650         15650            15650         15650
Adj R2                                          0.093          0.476         0.410          0.261             0.478          0.475   
Notes:  Data from the 2004 W ERS.  Sig asterisks: *10%, **5%, & ***1%.  All regressions include race and occupation dummies.
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Regression 1 in Table 3.2 contains the baseline results and, consistent with 
standard economic intuition, the wage is strongly positively correlated with job 
satisfaction.  The estimated coefficient implies that a 10% increase in the wage is 
associated with an 0.5% increase in job satisfaction.  For the present purposes, 
one other coefficient is worth noting: being a supervisor is strongly positively 
correlated with job satisfaction. 
The problem with this baseline specification is that, besides occupation 
dummies and the wage, it makes no attempt to control employee voice or 
autonomy.  Regression 2 in Table 3.2 reports the results of a regression with the 
addition of the indexes of autonomy and voice.  There are a number of important 
changes when voice and autonomy are included.
First, the estimated coefficient on the wage decreases by about 50%. 
Although the coefficient is still positive and significant, it now implies that a 10% 
increase in the wage results in only a 0.22% increase in job satisfaction. 
Considerably smaller than the 0.5% increase in Regression 1.  Second, the 
estimated coefficients on autonomy and voice are both positive and significant, 
and are 12 and 14 times larger than the coefficient on the wage, respectively.  A 
10% increase in autonomy is associated with a 2.3% increase in satisfaction, while 
10% increase in voice is associated with a 3% increase in satisfaction.  Notice also 
62
that the Adjusted R2, measuring the proportion of variability in the data 
accounted for by the regression model increases from 0.093 in Regression 1 to 
0.476 in Regression 2.  The results of a Wald test comparing equivalence of 
models 1 and 2 is rejected at the 0.01 level (Prob > F = 0.0000).  This finding is 
robust to likelihood-ratio tests (Prob > χ² =    0.0000).  F-tests across coefficients 
reject the joint hypothesis that autonomy and voice are zero (Prob > F =    0.0000) 
and the hypothesis that the wage is equal to zero (Prob > F =    0.0001).  
Based on the results in Regressions 1 and 2 from Table 3.2 two conclusions 
can be drawn: the wage, voice, and autonomy are all important correlates of job 
satisfaction, and, voice and autonomy are an order of magnitude stronger 
correlates of job satisfaction than the wage.  However, as is clear from the 
preceding discussion, there are a number of estimated coefficients that are not 
robust to the inclusion of autonomy and voice.  This raises important questions 
about the nature of the correlation between voice and/or autonomy, and the other 
variables in the regressions.  
            The estimated coefficients on the wage, supervisor, union, tenure, and 
education all see changes of at least 50% when voice and autonomy are included. 
And, in every case, the movement is towards zero.  For the present purposes, the 
most pertinent changes are on the wage and on being a supervisor.  We will deal 
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with each in turn.  The changes in the remaining coefficients are certainly 
interesting, as it suggests the over-arching importance of voice and autonomy in 
shaping job satisfaction, but are beyond the scope of this paper.
Regressions 3 and 4 help understand what is driving the large change in 
the coefficients on the wage and the supervisor dummy, respectively.  Regression 
3 includes only autonomy and the wage, excluding voice.  The bulk of the 
decrease in the coefficient on the wage is due to the inclusion of autonomy alone, 
reflecting a positive correlation between the wage and autonomy.  An auxiliary 
regression supports this claim, thought the results are not reported here.  In a 
regression of the wage on the same set of controls used in the satisfaction 
regression, the coefficient on autonomy is statistically significant and positive. 
The specific reasons for this correlation are not important.  What is important, 
and will be discussed in more detail below, is the fact that autonomy and the 
wage move together.21
Regression 4 includes only the wage and voice, excluding autonomy. 
Voice also has important effects on the estimated coefficients on the wage and 
being a supervisor.  With only voice, the coefficient on the wage is smaller, 
21 There are two likely candidates as explanations for this correlation.  The first is a ``good jobs'' effect. 
Some firms simply offer their workers higher wages and more autonomy, and workers with these types 
of employments report higher satisfaction.  Alternatively, principal-agent models of worker motivation 
also imply that the wage and autonomy should be positively correlated (e.g. Bowles and Gintis, (1985), 
Alchian and Demsetz, (1972), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Guy and Skott (2007)).
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though not nearly as small as with autonomy.  This suggests a small positive 
correlation between voice and the wage, though in results not reported here it is 
found that this correlation is not statistically significant.  
Voice and autonomy have almost equal impacts on the coefficient for 
being a supervisor, highlighting a potential pitfall with the estimation.  Given 
that voice and autonomy are, by definition, higher for supervisors, it could be 
possible that supervisors are driving the results for autonomy and voice in 
Regression 2.  If it were true that workers who put a higher value on voice and 
autonomy are more likely to be supervisors, we would expect that supervisors 
should exhibit higher levels of job satisfaction than non-supervisors before 
controlling for voice and autonomy.  Further, when voice and autonomy are 
controlled for, the value that supervisors place on voice and/or autonomy should 
be higher than non-supervisors, and the difference in average job satisfaction 
between supervisors and non-supervisors should be smaller.
Regression 5 of Table 2 reports the results of a regression identical to 
Regression 2, with the addition of three interaction terms.  The results are quite 
striking.  First, with the inclusion of the interactions, the coefficient on the 
supervisor dummy becomes negative and insignificant.  There is no average 
difference in job satisfaction between supervisors and non-supervisors.   Second, 
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the direct effects of autonomy and voice, respectively, are statistically identical to 
those reported in Regression 2.  Finally, the interaction between autonomy and 
the supervisor dummy is positive and significant, while the interaction with 
voice is negative and significant.
The stability of the direct effects of autonomy and voice is important 
because it demonstrates that the positive correlations between autonomy and 
satisfaction, and autonomy and voice are not driven by differences between 
supervisors and non-supervisors. 
3.6 Discussion of Results
Before discussing the broader implications of the results, a brief summary 
is warranted.  It is found that, without including measures of autonomy and 
voice as regressors, job satisfaction has a statistically significant positive 
correlation with the wage level.  However, there are many aspects of firm 
organization that could shape job satisfaction that are omitted from this 
regression.  Specifically, when indexes of autonomy and voice, respectively, are 
included in the satisfaction regression, the correlation between the wage and 
satisfaction decreases by roughly 50%, but remains positive and significant. 
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Further, the elasticities of satisfaction with respect to voice and autonomy, 
respectively, are 12 to 15 times large than the elasticity with respect to the wage. 
Most importantly, the proportion of variation of satisfaction explained by the 
inclusion of autonomy and voice into the regression specification (Regression 2 
vs Regression 1 in Table 2) shows much higher precision.  Standard ANOVA F-
tests comparing models support this claim.  The amount of autonomy and voice 
that a worker has over the firm is an important omitted variable, biasing the 
estimated coefficient on the wage upwards.  And, conditional upon having a job, 
voice and autonomy are considerably more important determinants of job 
satisfaction than the wage.  Our results are consistent with similar empirical 
studies, including Bartling, Fehr, and Schmidt (2009), and complement Dube and 
Freeman (2008), where it is found that revenue-sharing payment schemes only 
improve worker productivity when workers also have influence over their 
workplace.
By showing that autonomy and voice result in such large changes in the 
proportion of variation of satisfaction, our identification strategy suggests as 
strong causal relationship.  Note, however, that one may argue that there is a 
problem of reverse causality between tenure and satisfaction.  We should be clear 
that we are not interested in precisely establishing causality here.  For us, what 
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really matters is that the association between satisfaction and tenure is consistent 
with evidence from the literature.  We find this to be the case.  For example, 
Freeman (1978) reports that job tenure has “virtually no effect on job 
satisfaction,” but is associated with much lower quit rates.  All reported 
regression specifications with our voice index are consistent with this finding.  It 
may be then that when people have voice, tenure does not matter, and when 
people do not have voice, they tenure is negatively associated with satisfaction. 
3.7 Conclusion
The results leave open the reasons why satisfaction is so influenced by job 
characteristics that support worker autonomy and voice.  The behavioral 
program of study initiated by Deci (1971), which may contribute to an 
explanation, evaluates the interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivators. 
In short, self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, (1985), Deci and Ryan 
(2000a), and Deci and Ryan (2000b) suggests that the effect of an external 
intervention can support or thwart satisfaction depending on how the extrinsic 
institution affects the sense of  (1) autonomy, or the desire to self-organize own 
actions and for their actions to be causal, (2) competence, or the desire to feel 
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capable of affecting surroundings, or (3) relatedness, or the desire to feel 
connected to and respected by a social group.  Extrinsic incentives can crowd out 
satisfaction if they are perceived as controlling, but conversely can crowd in 
satisfaction if perceived as supportive of one's psychological needs.  Self-
determination theory explains our findings quite well as both increases in worker 
autonomy and voice support one's sense of autonomy, competence, and 
relatedness in intuitive ways.  
Based on the experienced utility of the employed, job-seekers would do 
themselves a favor by trying to obtain jobs that will give them more voice and 
autonomy since they will likely find them satisfying.  We've shown that the wage 
earned is important for job satisfaction, but it should not be given much weight 
compared to voice and autonomy.  A natural extension of our study would 
investigate how much weight job-seekers give to the wage, voice, and autonomy 
during their search.  If it were true that job-seekers only consider wage 
characteristics, they run the risk of being unsatisfied with their job.  Alternatively, 
if job-seekers do indeed make good forecast, economists will have to re-think the 
traditional assumptions that wages drive search behavior commonly made in 
models of employee search and matching.  
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CHAPTER 4 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF BEHAVIORAL 
AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
“[J]ust 15 years ago, research on incentives in organizations consisted to a disappointingly large extent of  
(a) identifying a ‘paradoxical’ feature of some internal labor market (for example, academic tenure, or pay  
raises based purely on seniority), then (b) crafting a theoretical model showing how that feature was in fact  
an efficient response to some contracting problem.  Most analyses stopped there.”--  Charness and Kuhn  
(2010) 
4.1 Introduction
The identification of facilities and circumstances that motivate labor has 
been, and remains, of central academic and practical significance.  Many 
“rigorous and analytic” (Lazear, 1996) models of motivation have been 
developed by economists, but the vast majority are (1) rooted in the rational 
choice model (RCM) where all agents are assumed to be both rational and solely 
motivated by their own private material interest, and (2) entirely without context, 
thereby eliminating the potential role of complementary institutions supportive 
of a motivational framework.  When, do these caveats hold?  Or more to the 
point, how well do theories of motivation rooted in the RCM predict employee 
performance?
To investigate these issues, one would ideally compare firms selected at 
70
random that only differ in one salient, structural dimension.  The 'real-world,' 
unfortunately, does not produce these data.  Further, when using firm-level data, 
it is impossible to fully control for all firm characteristics and processes when 
trying to isolate causal relationships of interest.  The appeal of using controlled 
experimental techniques is precisely because of the ability to mitigate many of 
these issues and better focus on the precise question of interest.  Although still a 
relatively new research methodology, experiments in economics have helped 
influence many aspects within the broader economics discipline.22  Some of the 
major contributions might be crudely summarized in the following three ways.23
First, experiments in economics have illustrated that the RCM predicts 
real-world behavior in some settings-- such as those in competitive experimental 
22 One example that supports this claim can be taken from the recently 2009 ISI Journal Citation Reports 
where the The journal Experimental Economics was rated as having an the 10th largest impact factor 
(measuring the average number of citations to articles published in science and social science journals) 
out of 245 economics journals evaluated.
23 It is well known, however, that subjects that participate in an economics experiment might misrepresent 
their own wants and desires due to any number of biases (i.e. trying to impress the experimenter or 
other subjects) that threaten both the internal and external validity of the experiment, thereby making 
inferences made from the data unreliable.   Some threats to the internal validity of a project include a 
decision task for subjects that is not salient and non-random sampling of subjects.  As an ideal 
robustness check, the results and evidence found from a specific experimental protocol should be 
repeated under the same set of controls more than once.  Falk and Fehr (2003) suggests that external 
validity for an experiment may hinge upon whether the relevant conditions in the experiment parallel 
those in the real-world, and second, whether or not behavioral regularities observed in the lab persist in 
new situations when the relevant underlying conditions remain substantially unchanged.  That is, if an 
experiment implements certain conditions that generate robust and replicable regularities, Falk and Fehr 
(2003) argue that we can inductively reason that the same behavioral regularities are likely to occur 
under similar conditions that would put an individual in the same cognitive state.  Indeed, a major 
application of experiments has been precisely to 'testbed' mechanisms and policies that have either not 
been implemented in the real-world, or the data needed to test such policies are difficult to obtain – 
including many incentive schemes and governance facilities thought to influence the level of worker 
productivity as will become apparent below.
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markets or in the presence of arbitrage -- and miserably in others -- such as in 
ultimatum or trust games.  That is, rationality and self-interest are now 
commonly interpreted as contextually dependent behaviors.  For example, Smith 
(1991), Chu and Chu (1990) and later Cherry et al. (2003), Brown et al. (2004), 
Henrich et al. (2001), Carpenter (2005), and Hoffman et al. (1994) all show that in 
the context of markets and market-like institutions, we typically observe 
behaviors that are very consistent with the assumptions in the RCM framework. 
A common point of emphasis among these studies is that complete market 
institutions support a very specific and well defined set of behaviors that appear 
to be self-serving and rational.  
Second, experiments have illuminated a number of cases where deviations 
from the RCM are systematic, common, and replicable.  Robust behavioral 
tendencies in controlled settings have already led to the emergence of many 
influential theories in Economics.  For example, scores of findings from 
experiments conducted by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky throughout the 
1970's and 1980's led to the development of Prospect Theory.  More recently, the 
lab experiments have repeatedly helped show that many individuals have strong 
preferences for the material well-being of others leading to the development of 
utilitarian models of other-regarding and social preferences (e.g. Fehr and 
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Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), or Charness and Rabin (2002)).  
Third, experimental economics has produced specific examples of how 
cultural norms influence individual behavior.  Where economists are trained to 
only consider the role of relative prices in guiding behavior, experiments have 
helped give estimates over how much social instruments such as communication 
(e.g. Sally (1995)), social sanction (e.g. Ostrom et al.(1994), Masclet et al. (2003), 
and social reward Carpenter and Seki (2005)) influence individual behavior.
In the following chapter we review (mostly) experimental economic work 
that has evaluated personnel models of motivation.  In Section 1 we review the 
behavioral effect of different incentive contracts; in Section 2, we review studies 
that evaluate the role of general labor market conditions on worker behavior; in 
Section 3 we examine some experimental work on the role of loyalty, job 
satisfaction, and intrinsic motivation, and in Section 4, we review work that 
examines the motivational effect of different firm governance structures.  In the 
final section, we conclude.
4.2.  Incentive contracts
Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler  (1990) suggest that incentive contracts can be 
defined as payment schemes that link pay to either individual or group output. 
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In the following section, we present a summary of reported behaviors from 
controlled experiments of different compensation schemes that have been 
evaluated in the lab. 
4.2.1 Piece-rates
Piece-rates are incentive contracts that guarantee a pre-determined level of 
payment for each unit of output produced.  For all practical purposes, piece-rate 
contracts are non-strategic, utility-maximization problems.  The benefits of 
production are well defined and the costs are private and unique to each 
employee.  In theory, piece-rates shift all risks, costs, and benefits of labor onto 
employees after the commission rate is chosen by the employers.  In a traditional 
game-theoretic framework, the price-rate is found by solving for the optimal rate, 
given the best-response of the employee.  When we assume a linear production 
function, full-information in production, zero uncertainty, and know the risk-
preferences of workers, finding the optimal piece-rate that would motivate labor 
is a straight-forward exercise.  These conditions, however, never hold in practice. 
Laboratory experiments designed to test the efficacy of piece-rate 
contracts reveal that when subjects are given their private cost function and also 
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the production function of a homogeneous good, behavior conforms to the 
income-maximizing value of effort (Bull et al., 1987).  Similar findings hold in a 
real-effort experiment (where the cost function is endogenous and unique to each 
worker) conducted by van Dijk et al., (2001).  They further find, however, that 
piece-rates result in lower mean outputs compared to compensation schemes 
based on relative performance.  Shearer (2004) finds evidence from a field 
experiment conducted on a tree-farm that piece-rate schemes increase the 
productivity of workers by roughly 20% when compared to fixed-wage 
payments.  Shi (2007) uses two field-experiments to again find productivity 
increases when compensation contracts switch from fixed wage to a piece-rate 
scheme.  In addition to the costs associated with finding the optimal piece-rate in 
practice, piece-rates cannot be implemented in most occupations since they 
require perfectly measurable output.  Relative performance based payment, 
therefore, may offer a viable alternative which we turn to below. 
4.2.2  Rank-order tournaments
The model in Lazear and Rosen (1981), shows that when the cost of 
monitoring effort is prohibitively high, compensation based upon one's relative 
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performance in the firm can be as efficient, and under certain conditions, 
superior to piece-rate incentive schemes.  They consider the incentive properties 
of a rank-order payment scheme that awards predetermined prizes that are 
distributed based on the relative performance of the participants.  By assuming 
that all workers are identical, and their behavior is consistent with the RCM, they 
show that (1) the effort of all workers will increase with an increase in the prize 
spread, (2) workers' effort is independent of the fallback (loser's) wage, and (3) 
workers can provide the same level of effort and end up being paid different 
amounts.  Furthermore, Lazear and Rosen (1984) suggest that by paying workers 
on the basis of their relative performance, employers save on measurement costs 
and the nature of the risk borne by workers when compared to piece-rate 
incentive schemes.  Williamson et al. (1975) suggest that the possibility of vertical 
promotion could act as a substitute to excessive monitoring by rewarding 
workers that exhibit 'consummate' behavior over time.  In Lazear and Rosen 
(1989), however, the authors speculate that the behavior of workers in 
tournaments could be affected by the perceived fairness of the ranking.
The experimental research has revealed behavior consistent with theory 
insofar that tournaments and piece-rates typically result in comparable levels of 
effort, but experiments also reveal that the variance of effort under tournament 
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compensation schemes is usually much higher than what is theoretically 
predicted.  This particular pattern has been noted in chosen effort lab 
experiments (Bull et al. (1987)), real effort experiments of van Dijk et al. (2001), 
and the field experiments conducted in Shearer (2004).  As Drago and Heywood 
(1989) suggest, high variance of effort could lead to “costly and unexpected 
inventory buildups, shortages, and production bottlenecks.”  Another potential 
drawback of tournaments highlighted in an experiment by Carpenter et al. (2007) 
is that tournaments elicit a much higher tendency of sabotage.  They find that the 
positive incentive effects of a tournament are effectively canceled out due to 
sabotage when compared to a piece-rate compensation scheme.  
Frank and Cook (1995) further worry that tournament compensation 
schemes might be too attractive to workers.  Because of the strong behavioral 
tendency for individuals to be overconfident, they fear that workers would select 
too frequently into a tournament contract, even when it may not be in their best 
material interest to do so.  In an experiment aimed partly to test the validity of 
this claim, Vandegrift et al. (2007) find only “modest overcrowding”of 
tournaments across various conditions.  Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), 
however, find evidence from the lab that preferences for operating in competitive 
environments is quite gendered with men selecting into tournament 
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compensation schemes over twice as women of equal ability.  
Although some guidelines of tournament design can be found throughout 
the personnel literature that might aid in selecting the optimal size of the prize, 
or what the prize spread should be (e.g. Lazear and Rosen (1981)), all of these 
models are constructed with a preference bias.  For example, it may be that 
individuals may have social preferences but love to compete, or they are only 
concerned with their private payoff, but do not want to compete etc.  Rather than 
assuming a specific set of preferences, Freeman and Gelber (2010) use 
experiments to investigate if and how different variations in parameters of the 
tournament design such as the number of competitors, number of prizes, and the 
prize spread, affect behavior under tournament incentives.  They find that effort 
in a real-effort experiment (solving-mazes) is lowest when payments are 
independent of performance; higher when a single, large prize is given; and 
highest when multiple, differentiated prizes are given.  Although most 
tournaments are designed to pit workers against one another, many other 
compensation schemes have been based on cooperative rewards, which we turn 
to below.
78
4.2.3.  Group rewards:  Profit Sharing and Gainsharing
Gainsharing and profit sharing incentives respectively link wages of 
employees to the performance of group or firm accomplishments.  In general, 
profit sharing takes the form of end-of year cash bonuses and/or the deposit of 
bonuses into retirement funds linked to the profitability of the firm, whereas 
gainsharing plans split the financial value of gains to the firm when workers 
exceed performance targets to be paid to employees as they occur.  Because the 
payoff to any single individual is tied to the performance of the group as a 
whole, the success of group reward schemes is contingent upon the capacity to 
sustain high performance from all employees despite the presence of free-riding 
incentives that arise when private contributions are both (1) difficult to verify, 
and (2) the extra private payoff associated with the marginal contribution of any 
worker is diluted by a factor of 1/n.  Within the RCM the 'free-rider problem' 
would prevent group incentive schemes from being effective yet the evidence 
from the empirical record is suggestive that this need not necessarily be true.  In 
their meta-analysis on a series of projects investigating profit sharing incentive 
plans in real-world firms, Weizman and Kruse (1990) conclude that profit sharing 
has at least a weak-positive correlation with firm productivity.  This finding 
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rightfully raises questions regarding if, how, and when free-riding affects groups 
and whether there are lessons to be learned from successful cases that can inform 
the development of general strategies to sustain cooperative behavior in similar 
social dilemmas.
In a world without context and comprised entirely of rational agents, the 
folk theorem of noncooperative game theory gives plausible stories of how group 
incentive schemes can overcome free-riding in repeated interactions when the 
discount rate of agents is sufficiently small so that future outcomes are valued 
similarly to present outcomes (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986).  Under these 
conditions, cooperation can be rationally preferred and sustained through time 
by egoists in infinitely repeated games when all, or some fraction of agents 
(depending on the parameters defined by theory) share the exogenous traits for 
specific, and credible 'tit-for-tat' or 'grim reaper' strategies.  
Furthermore, reputation has been a phenomena studied extensively in 
understanding the strategic behavior of economic actors in a variety of settings. 
The Kreps and Wilson (1982) 'reputation effect' model shows that incomplete 
information regarding the preferences of other players (egoist or altruist) is 
sufficient for an egoist player to play a cooperative strategy because of the 
unverifiable belief that the population may have some actors that will play a 
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cooperative strategy.  When evaluated in the lab, Andreoni and Miller (1993) find 
evidence from a series of experiments in repeated PD games that subjects were 
much more cooperative than predicted by Kreps and Wilson, suggesting that a 
non-trivial portion of their subjects were demonstrating altruism beyond the 
purpose of building an otherwise ‘false’ reputation.  Cooper et al. (1996) test and 
compare theories of reputation building with theories of altruism that explain 
cooperation in both one-shot and finitely repeated PD games, but are unable to 
find strong evidence in support of either theory, instead concluding that the 
context of the interaction strongly drove the behavior of their subjects.
A major tool used in experimental economics, voluntary contribution 
mechanism games (VCMs) have been used to study free-rider issues by creating 
an environment where the option to free-ride is perfectly salient.  This is done 
intentionally so that when subjects decide not to free-ride, we can confidently 
conclude that they did not want to free-ride.  Specifically, a standard VCM 
requires each subject to decide if, and how much they want to contribute to a 
collective project and the payoffs are calibrated so that full contribution to the 
collective project from all group members would result in a Pareto optimal 
outcome.  Each subject, however, has a private, material incentive to free-ride for 
all strategies played by the other subjects in their same group.  Over the course of 
81
20-30 years, data collected in the lab through hundreds of versions of VCM 
games provide a handful of general lessons and behavioral regularities that 
provide insight into fundamental questions regarding (1) whether the incentives 
to free-ride lead to free-riding behavior, and (2) to the extent that incentives to 
free-ride do lead to free-riding behavior, how free-riding behavior can be 
successfully mitigated in the lab.  The goal is to use VCMs to study how free-
riding behavior might be overcome in an environment that strongly supports 
free-riding.  It is dangerous to generalize but the experimental record of VCM 
games has produced some lessons for the management of the free-rider problem 
that are widely recognized across the social sciences.  
4.2.3.1.  Lesson 1
In the absence of institutional controls, free-riding increases 
Although the idea that strong material incentives to free-ride will lead to 
free-riding behavior seems intuitively obvious, experiments routinely find the 
tendency for subjects to act in manners that defy the predictions of theory.  In the 
baseline linear VCM public goods game, mean contributions from subjects hover 
near 50% of their endowment in the first few rounds, with a steady decline 
towards the Nash equilibrium of mutual defection after only a few rounds of 
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play.  The significance of this result adds credence to the fear that group incentive 
payment schemes might not work by themselves since free-riding likely occurs in 
the absence of institutions that counteract this tendency.  
4.2.3.2  Lesson 2
Inter-group competition induces high intra-group effort. 
Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) test how well alternative types of group 
incentive systems explain behavior in the lab.  They investigate the behavior of 
groups under (1) simple revenue sharing partnerships (modeled and tested as a 
linear VCM), (2) target-based systems such as profit sharing (modeled and tested 
as a linear VCM with a provision point target mechanism), (3) gainsharing 
(modeled and tested as a linear VCM with provision point target that generated 
endogenously by the previous output of workers), (4) a group tournament 
(where payoffs to the group were contingent upon relative, rather than absolute, 
performance of the group against the performance of other groups, and (5) an 
individual wage-cum-supervision mechanism (where the firm offers a wage to 
workers provided that they provide an effort e* when on the job with a 
probability p of being monitored each period; if the worker is caught working at 
an effort lower than e*, she is fired).  The novel finding reported in their paper is 
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that group competition mechanisms led to both the highest mean output with 
relatively low variance.  They also re-validate previous findings from PG 
experiments that only high levels of monitoring are effective in mitigating free-
riding.  Their data indicate that only profit sharing and revenue sharing contracts 
had lower variance but they were Pareto dominated since most of the data 
showed subjects playing the Nash strategy.  These results are consistent with the 
findings from Erev et al. (1993), and Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006) that 
show how intergroup competition markedly reduces free riding -- hinting at the 
importance of team identity in overcoming social dilemmas in team production. 
We return to this in section 3 below.
4.2.3.3 Lesson 3:  
Forcing contracts can work/higher provision points induce higher contributions.
As mentioned above, Nalbantian and Schotter evaluated group behavior 
VCM's with exogenous and endogenously established targets meant to serve as 
proxies for profit sharing and gainsharing incentives schemes respectively.  They 
note that the design of these contracts are a test of the  forcing contract solution 
to the free-rider problem proposed by Holmstrom (1982), where workers would 
share in any revenues generated that exceed the pre-established target and 
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would receive a significantly lower penalty wage if they were to fail in exceeding 
the target.  Theoretically, forcing contract VCM games can have multiple 
equilibria similar to an assurance game (if contributions are not returned) some 
of which can include positive contributions from rational individuals.  Various 
forcing contract VCM games in the lab have been evaluated, and results show 
that subjects typically do not settle on the (socially optimal) cooperative 
equilibrium (e.g. Isaac et al. (1989))  In contrast to these studies, however, 
Spraggon (2002) identifies two forcing contract instruments that either tax 
(punish) or subsidize (reward) subjects depending upon the relative distance of 
the group total to the optimal level of contributions.  Both instruments result in 
socially optimal contributions.  Spraggon's study provides evidence that 
exogenous targeting instruments can be designed to mitigate free-riding in 
groups. 
4.2.3.4 Lesson 4
  Punishment works.
Anderson and Stafford (2003) find that the increased probability of 
receiving a punishment has a smaller effect in inducing high contributions than 
does the severity of a punishment.  Dickinson (2001) shows that voluntary 
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contributions increase by 10-28% in groups when both punishment (sticks) and 
rewards (carrots) are made available to players.  Andreoni et al. (2003) also find 
that the institutional arrangement where rewards and punishment are present 
induces high levels of cooperation in proposer-responder games.  Their findings 
suggest that rewards and punishments by themselves are not as effective as a 
combination of the two in inducing cooperation.
As Masclet et al. (2003) show, punishment need not be monetary.  They 
conduct an experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of monetary versus non-
monetary punishments.  Their results suggest that monetary punishment 
sustains higher contributions than does non-monetary sanctions--but not by 
much.  Non-monetary sanctions such as expressed disappointment and 
disapproval induce higher contributions to the public good.  They also find, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, that non-monetary sanctions are more effective in 
partner treatments, than in stranger treatments.  Carpenter and Seki (2005) also 
present results from a field experiment showing that disapproval in the form of a 
picture of an unhappy face can induce higher voluntary contributions to the 
public good.  
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4.2.3.5 Lesson 5
Communication works
It may be reasonable to assume that communication among individuals is 
a vital instrument in situations where socially desirable outcomes require 
coordination.  Ledyard (1995) singles out communication and the marginal per 
capita return to be the two most important variables in obtaining cooperative 
solutions in public goods games.  Sally (1995) conducts a meta-analysis of social 
dilemma games over a 35-year period and finds that when communication is 
allowed, cooperation increases circa 40% over the baseline “institution-less” 
environments.  The primary forms of communication that are commonly 
introduced as treatment variables in the experimental literature are cheap-talk, 
and face-to-face communication.
Cooper et al. (1992) provide evidence of how pre-play “cheap-talk”—or 
costless, non-binding, non-verifiable communication that does not affect the 
actual payoffs -- can help achieve coordination in two-player coordination games 
with multiple Nash equilibria with a  Pareto-dominant equilibrium.  They note 
that the addition of a cheap-talk treatment does not eliminate any equilibrium 
outcomes of the original game, concluding that at least theoretically, cheap-talk 
should be a transparent variable action that can (should) simply be ignored. 
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They find that cheap-talk can help coordination, but the rules or institutions that 
govern the interaction also matter.  That is, different cheap-talk regimes may 
have different effects on efficient play.
The role of cheap-talk has been evaluated extensively to unpack its 
robustness as an efficiency and/or fairness-enhancing mechanism under a slew of 
different conditions, including its impact in ultimatum bargaining outcomes 
(Croson et al. 2003) and even in its role in identifying possible scenarios in which 
R&D cooperation can be obtained (Suetens 2005).  Duffy and Feltovich (2002) 
compare the effectiveness of cheap-talk with the effectiveness of the subject’s 
access to the past observations of the other subjects.  They find that effectiveness 
of cheap-talk is contingent on the type of coordination game being played. 
Specifically, they find cheap-talk to be more effective than access to the decision 
history of other players in stage hunt games, but the results do not generalize to 
the Chicken and PD games where past observations are more effective in 
influencing coordination among the players. 
Unrestricted face-to-face communication in experimental settings require 
subjects to be  in the same location so they can identify all of the other players. 
Subjects are then allowed to talk about whatever they want among themselves. 
In their 1994 book, Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker report in a series of 
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experiments that continuous face-to-face communication more than tripled 
cooperation rates in a repeated CPR games; similarly, Frohlich and Oppenheimer 
(1998) found that cooperation tripled in VCM public goods games.  Cardenas 
(2003) conducts a field experiment in a rural village with subjects who routinely 
depend on a common pool resource and finds that face-to-face communication 
does not have the effects observed in experiments in Ostrom, Gardner, and 
Walker.  Instead, Cardenas finds that individuals who do not depend on the 
resource as much as the other parties-- because their financial status allows them 
allows them to ‘go to market’—are not trusted by the other subjects, despite the 
many (false) promises made when face-to-face communication is allowed.
4.3.  Labor-Market Conditions
Several theories investigate the relationship between job rents, 
unemployment, and productivity.  The main theoretical models in this tradition 
share the common intuition that both the unemployment rate and wages are 
positively correlated with worker effort.  
The intuition of the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) model suggests that wages 
that exceed the competitive market rate would reduce shirking, but if every firm 
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were to raise their wages workers would again begin to shirk since they are no 
longer earning a rent.  It follows, however, that because all wages rise the 
demand for labor would decrease and create a positive level of unemployment, 
and with positive unemployment, workers would therefore not shirk since they 
would not immediately be able to obtain another job if they were fired.  In short, 
the model predicts that the level of effort by workers is determined by both the 
unemployment rate and the level of wages.
The Akerlof 1982 model is based on the notion that worker effort depends 
on the work norms of the relevant reference group.  He states that the firm can 
raise group work norms and hence mean group effort by paying workers a “gift” 
of wages in excess of the minimum required to keep workers, and would in 
return receive effort higher then the minimum required to stay employed. 
Akerlof and Yellen (1990), build upon this framework and put forth the slightly 
different “fair-wage hypothesis” which states that workers form a notion of a 'fair-
wage' and will either give more or less effort if the wage they are being paid is 
higher or lower than the fair-wage level.  We now turn to the empirical evidence 
aimed to test the predictions of these models.
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4.3.1  Testing labor market conditions in the lab 
The incentive to work hard in an efficiency wage model is a function of the 
rent received by a worker.  The job rent can be created in two ways-- either by 
paying a higher wage than the reservation wage of a worker, or by reducing 
fallback position of the worker.  The common interpretation of the fallback 
position throughout much of the efficiency-wage literature, is that it is a function 
of the unemployment rate, or more more broadly as the opportunity cost of 
employment, or “the availability of other jobs, unemployment insurance, and the 
like.” Bowles (1985)).  The basic intuition that drives the connection between 
effort and labor market conditions is such that when employment opportunities 
are in low supply (i.e. high unemployment), employees would be more apt to 
give full effort since they cannot easily find another job, whereas when 
employment opportunities abound, the opposite is true.
In non-experimental empirical studies, this relationship has been used to 
explain the rates of productivity growth (Weisskopf et al. (1983), the incidence of 
strikes in the U.S. (Schor and Bowles (1987)), and the rise in work intensity in the 
U.K during the 1980's (Schor, 1987).  International comparisons vary considerably 
across countries and the effects of unemployment on  productivity appear 
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strongest where industrial relations are most 'confrontational' (Weisskopf, 
(1987)).  Green and Weisskopf (1990) find evidence that show how the worker 
discipline effect of unemployment affects different industries with different 
intensities.
Turning to the lab, Falk et al. (2005) offer experimental evidence that 
contradicts standard labor market models that assume minimum wages do not 
affect the labor supply schedule.  They find that  minimum wages have 
significant and lasting effects on subjects’ reservation wages which persist even 
after the minimum wage has been removed.  They further suggest that because 
of this, profit-maximizing firms may find it optimal to increase employment after 
the introduction of a binding minimum wage since fewer offers would be 
rejected by prospective employees.  The 2-stage experimental framework in 
Brandts and Charness (2004) is similar, but workers can offer discretionary levels 
of effort (instead of simply accepting an offer).  They use gift-exchange games to 
study the effect of two dimensions of a labor market conditions.  They consider 
both 1) the impact of a competitive imbalance in an experimental labor market by 
creating an excess supply of firms or an excess supply of workers in the market, 
and also 2) the effects of a minimum wage in the market with excess supply of 
workers.  They find that competition does not have a significant impact on either 
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wage offers or efforts relative to standard findings in gift-exchange and only 
limited evidence that workers offer less effort when a minimum wage is 
imposed.  
Brown, Falk and Fehr (2008), find that tight labor market conditions do 
not necessarily lead to decreases in productivity when relational contracts-- or 
contracts that are based upon a relationship of trust between parties-- are 
established through a gift-exchange with contingent-renewal.  They do find, 
however, that high-wage, high-effort long-term employment relationships are 
not as frequent in the slack labor market treatments they conducted in Brown, 
Falk, and Fehr (2004).  These papers demonstrate that the rate of unemployment 
does not have a large effect on effort in incomplete labor contracts.  When 
markets are complete, however, they show that the presence of competition on 
one side of the market leads to indifference over the identity of the trading 
partner and a concentration of rents to the short-side of the market.  This is also a 
common finding in competitive bargaining games.  For example, Roth et al. 
(1991) conduct an ultimatum game with one-to-one matching and a ‘market 
game’ in which a single responder can agree to an offer from nine agents on the 
other side of the market.  The competition among proposers drives offers down 
and acceptance rates up.  
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4.3.1.1 Threats
Where Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) show how a worker would avoid 
shirking provided that the equilibrium unemployment rate were sufficiently 
large, Bowles and Gintis (1985) further stress how employers might exploit their 
'short-side power' resulting from positive unemployment-- specifically by using 
threats and sanction of an employee.  Although studies that evaluate the effects 
of the threat of expulsion in experimental labor markets are rather limited, 
Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) show that when members of a group had the 
opportunity to vote to expel fellow group members, contributions rose to nearly 
100% of endowments in a linear VCM game.  Croson et al. (2003) find evidence 
that incredible threats of future actions can influence outcomes in Ultimatum 
Games, both in the short- and long-term, while Knez and Camerer (1995) 
conduct ultimatum games where players received a known outside option if the 
initial offer is rejected.  They find that the rate of rejected offers was higher than 
what is observed in typical UG environments.
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4.3.2 Gift exchange game
The gift-exchange game is usually set up so that the principal makes the 
initial wage offer to a worker and workers have the opportunity of accepting 
them (usually without the opportunity of making counter-offers) followed by the 
choice of workers of a privately costly effort level.  The payoff framework for a 
gift-exchange game is therefore similar in many respects to a sequential 
prisoner's dilemma since the payoffs are structured so that higher wages yield 
lower monetary payoffs for firms and higher ones for workers (holding effort 
constant) and higher effort levels have the reverse effect on respective payoffs for 
firms and workers (holding wages constant), but the combination of high effort 
and high wages is the Pareto optimal outcome.  Classical game theory predicts 
that workers would follow their material self-interest, and subsequently choose 
the lowest possible effort level irrespective of the wage offer.  In anticipation of 
this, fully rational firms will only make the lowest possible wage offer.
In a series of experiments aimed at examining the behavior of people 
under variants of the gift-exchange game, economists have found a strong 
tendency for people to reciprocate high offers (framed both as wages and prices) 
with high responses (framed as quality or effort).  Fehr et al. (1998), Fehr et al. 
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(1993), Gachter and Falk (2001), and Charness and Haruvy (2002), Maximiano et 
al. (2007) are a subset of an extensive experimental literature that show a regular 
behavioral pattern that supports the basic gift-exchange hypothesis in labor 
market settings.  In contrast to these studies, however, Rigdon (2002) found that a 
double-blind gift-exchange with a higher cost of effort resulted in much higher 
levels of free-riding.  Other studies note the importance of group effects in gift-
exchange (Hannan et al. (2002)), and how asymmetric, or incomplete information 
of the surplus can further affect reciprocal behavior (Sadreih et al. (2003)).  
Gneezy and List (2006) note that the process of implementation of the gift 
wage is large factor in the levels of reciprocation.  Specifically, they find that 
when subjects are surprised with a higher wage than they expected, they work 
harder than workers earning the same wage without being surprised.  These 
findings are in line with a more general notion of reciprocal behavior where 
individuals tend to respond positively to friendly actions, and negatively to 
hostile ones (e.g. Berg et al. (1995), Fehr and Gachter (2000), Andreoni et al. 
(2003)) and Falk (2007)).  
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4.4.  Non-pecuniary motives
“If one could enhance a common interest in nonshirking in the guise of a team loyalty or team spirit, the  
team would be more efficient... Obviously the team is better, with team spirit and loyalty, because of the  
reduced shirking.... [Loyalty] can be preached with an aura of moral code of conduct-a morality with  
literally the same basis as the ten commandments- to restrict our conduct toward what we would choose if  
we bore our full costs.”
-- Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
Through the years it has become less obvious that remuneration is always 
the most effective way to increase worker motivation and satisfaction.  For 
example, a study conducted by Brulin and Nilsson (1991) evaluated 1500 
randomly selected projects intended to reduce job stress and report that these 
projects led to significant improvements in employee satisfaction and motivation. 
They also found that these projects led to a reduction in production errors and 
better delivery times.  Terra (1995), moreover, found that the implementation of 
self-regulating work-teams was strongly associated with a decrease in employee 
absenteeism related to sickness in the canning industry, and Dale-Olsen (2006) 
found that fringe benefits reduced turnover more than equivalent wage 
increases. 
Personnel economists usually focus on the influence of monetary variables 
and have not made the same inroads into understanding psychological and 
sociological dimensions in explaining motivation.  This is partly due to the 
modeling restrictions that accompany the RCM, but also because of an absence of 
97
strong empirical findings to build off of.   We posit that experimental methods 
offer great potential in bridging what has been studied in related disciplines with 
Economics.  In this section we review non-pecuniary motivations and behavior 
that have their inspiration in industrial and social psychology with support from 
the experimental economic record.
4.4.1 Identity
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) define identity as a person’s self image — both 
as an individual and as part of a group.  Building upon insights from Psychology 
on the effects of in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination, they model 
two ways of incorporating identity into the general discussion regarding work 
and work incentives.  The first model highlights the idea of forming an identity 
with the goals of the firm.  They claim that economists have overlooked the 
significance of “the identification of the officeholder with the office” and its 
motivational consequences.  In this model, workers experience a loss in utility 
when they do not follow the rules of their superiors or act in the interests of the 
firm.  They additionally model a second case where workers identify at the 
group level within the firm.  In this model, the authors claim that there is an 
98
organizational policy trade-off between the introduction of a monitor-manager 
and policies that foster the identification of workers with firm goals.  They 
describe “corporate culture,” similarly to Hodgson (1996) where 'culture' is 
interpreted as internalized preferences.  
When testing the claim that  group identification can suppress self-interest 
in favor of collective interest, the experiments conducted by Eckel and Grossman 
(2005) find that in a repeated VCM overt means of identification of a team do not 
generate greater cooperation than with random, anonymous team assignments. 
However, when subjects were asked to work together on an unrelated and 
unpaid project before playing a repeated VCM, cooperative behavior was much 
higher than the baseline.  These findings are consistent with in Cox et al. (1991) 
where greater cooperative play has been observed in ethnically homogeneous 
groups, and Charness and Jackson (2007) also find that salient group 
membership affects behavior in a strategic environment.
When one's group identity is threatened in an economic interactions by an 
out-group, McLeish and Oxoby (2007) find that in-group individuals cooperate 
more with fellow in-group members.  Furthermore, the authors observe greater 
negative reciprocity among in-group individuals when the in-group’s norm of 
behavior are violated. 
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4.4.2 Trust and Trustworthiness
Although there is widespread recognition of the important roles that trust 
and trustworthiness play in facilitating behavior when contracts are incomplete, 
economists have struggled with how best to conceptualize “trust.” Berg, 
Dickhaut and McCabe's (1995) (BDM) trust game,  however, has standardized the 
economist's interpretation of trust and trustworthiness.  There are three basic 
stages in the trust game.  First, a proposer must decide what portion (if any) of 
their endowment will be sent to a responder.  Whatever the proposer decides to 
send to the responder is multiplied by a factor greater than 1 (usually 3) and then 
given to the responder.  The responder must then decide how much (if any) of 
her new sum should be sent back to the proposer.  Hundreds of studies that 
marginally differ from the BDM baseline game aim to illuminate how different 
experimental conditions could affect the willingness to trust (send over the 
endowment), or to be trustworthy (send part of the new sum back) to better 
understand how to mitigate moral hazard when contracts are incomplete.
There are disagreements in the literature over the why trust or 
trustworthiness are observed.  For example, it may be that trust is not any 
different from risk.  Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), however, compare the 
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decision to trust a stranger in a one-shot interaction equivalent to taking a risky 
bet finding that first movers require a higher probability in order to trust than in 
situations where nature determines the outcome.  This suggests that the decision 
to trust entails an additional risk premium to balance the costs of trust betrayal. 
Ashraf et al. (2006) finds that while expectations of trustworthiness explain most 
of the variance in trust in their study, unconditional kindness also plays a 
significant role.  Conversely, they find that unconditional kindness accounts for 
most of the variance in trustworthiness, while reciprocity plays a comparatively 
smaller role.  The findings reported by Gneezy et al. (2000) suggest that 
inequality aversion is not required to observe trusting behavior using a variant of 
the BDM game.  These results indicate that we are getting closer to 
distinguishing between Machiavellian and pure intention of that explain 
observable trusting behavior, but in the meantime, we have already begun to 
learn what institutional factors contribute more or less trust in a relationship. 
Below we summarize some findings.
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4.4.2.1 Past relationships
The formation of a trusting relationship is formed among a pair of people 
does not imply that a trusting person in one relationship would be trusting in 
another.  Gueth et al. (1998) find support in favor of this claim, but Engle-
Warnick and Slonim (2004) find strong evidence that the length of a past trusting 
relationship with a person greatly influences trust and trustworthiness in new 
relationships; shorter-lasting relationships have an immediate negative impact 
on trusting behavior,  while longer-lasting relationships have the opposite effect. 
4.4.2.2  Type of relationships
Burnham, et al. (2000) find that language matters for the outcomes in a 
trust game.  In different variants they use the terms "counterpart," “partner” and 
opponent in referring to the person that an individual is matched with in a trust 
game.  These changes in wording lead to significant differences in both trust and 
trustworthiness; trustworthiness more than doubles when "partner" is used 
instead of "opponent."   Danielson and Holm (2007) report the results from an 
experiment in which all subjects were members of a church.  When comparing 
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the trusting behavior (of the first mover) to that of typical student samples, they 
detect no differences in their findings.  They do find, however, that churchgoers 
returned a significantly higher proportion than do students.  Engle-Warnick and 
Slonim (2006) find that the level of trust is lower in relationships that will end at 
a definite time than when the relationships end at an indefinite time. 
4.4.2.3 Demographic and cross-cultural differences in trust and 
trustworthiness:
There are several studies that essentially regress demographic variables on 
trust to investigate if the socio-economic characteristics of a population can 
explain trust.  For example, Gachter et al. (2004) relate answers from a survey to 
experimental evidence on trust from non-student and student participants in 
Russia, while Fehr et al. (2002) employ a similar methodology in Germany.  The 
results offer an interesting set of lessons regarding heterogeneous trusting 
behavior among the respective populations.  The lesson may not be generalizable 
but could certainly be used as an additional consideration in the development of 
group-targeted policy initiatives. 
More generally, Glaeser et al. (2000) find that when individuals are closer 
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socially, trust and trustworthiness rise and that trustworthiness declines when 
partners are of different races or nationalities.  Similarly, Cassar et al. (2007) 
present evidence from field experiments in South Africa and Armenia.  Subjects 
participate in trust and microfinance games and the study suggests that personal 
trust between group members and social homogeneity are more important to 
group loan repayment than general societal trust or acquaintanceship between 
members.  In the lab, however, Anderson et al. (2006) find that induced 
heterogeneity by varying the show-up payments given to subjects did not 
consistently affect a willingness to trust, or to be trustworthy.  Futhermore, 
Bouckaert, and Dhaene (2004) find that male small businessman in Belgium of 
either Turkish or Belgian ethnic origin exhibit levels of trust and reciprocity that 
are independent of their own ethnic origin, and that of the opposite party, while 
Willinger (2003) again finds no evidence of discrimination in an inter-cultural 
trust game between French and German participants. Fershtman and Gneezy 
(2001), however, find a systematic mistrust in Israeli Jewish society towards men 
of Eastern origin.  Interestingly, the observed ethnic discrimination in their study 
was entirely a male phenomenon.  Eckel (2007) finds men less trusting and 
trustworthy than women; yet Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2007) in the other 
hand find that men are more trusting than women and that there are no 
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significant gender differences in reciprocal behavior.  Sutter and Kocher (2007) 
find that trust within one's own age group increases almost linearly from early 
childhood to early adulthood, but stays constant within different adult age 
groups, while trustworthiness is constant across age groups.  Colleti et al. (2005) 
find that sanctioning and monitoring systems aimed to improve cooperation can 
also increase trust among collaborators and Masclet and Penard (2007) find that 
reputation management mechanisms in the form of evaluations and ratings often 
found in online marketplaces can build trust and increase market efficiency. 
They compare different evaluation systems --  simultaneous evaluation, 
sequential evaluation, evaluation with a waiting option and find that the 
existence of a reputation system increases the level of trust and cooperation. 
Additionally, Fehr and List (2004) conduct a field experiment to find that 
CEO's tend to exhibit behavior that is both more trusting and trustworthy than 
common student subjects suggesting that the difference is perhaps due to their 
recognition that trust and efficiency are often positively correlated with one 
another in business practices.
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4.4.3 Intrinsic motivation
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) suggest that strong identification with the firm 
might act as a substitute for remuneration to motivate employees, and that firm 
identity should be understood as a “new type” of capital, since it could 
contribute to the profitability of the firm.24  If one were to use Walrasian 
economics as a prescriptive guide for increasing the affective attachment of 
individuals, they would likely introduce better price (wage) instruments. 
Decades of work in experimental psychology, and more recently in experimental 
economics, has illuminated that the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivators is quite complex.  For example, an experiment testing the effects of 
different payment incentives for solicitors seeking collecting charitable 
donations, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) find who subjects that received small 
payments visited fewer houses than participants who were not paid anything for 
their effort.  Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) also found that the fines that were 
24 Beyond economics, there are few topics in industrial and organizational psychology have been studied 
as has the relation between one's job attitude and performance in the firm (e.g., Brief and Weiss, (2002), 
Judge et al. (2001), Meyer and Allen, (1997), Mowday et al. (1982), Staw et al. (1994)). Numerous 
meta-analyses have demonstrated that positive job attitudes, such as commitment and satisfaction, are 
accompanied by better work outcomes (e.g. Cooper-Hakim and Viswesvaran (2005), Harrison (2006), 
Meyer et al. (2002), Riketta, (2002)) giving credence to the classic managerial claim that “happy 
workers make better workers.”  Iaffeldano and Muchinshky (1985) find evidence in support of the claim 
that job satisfaction is positively correlated with performance, while employees who are experiencing 
low satisfaction in their employment are typically less creative and innovative, and more dis-attached 
from the goals of the firm (Amabile 1996).  
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implemented on parents that were late for picking up their children from 
daycare resulted in a significant increase in late-coming parents.  Other widely 
cited experimental studies have shown that payment for blood donation 
decreased blood donation (Titmuss, (1971)), fines increased common pool 
resource exploitation relative to no-fine groups (Cardenas et al. (2000)), fines 
deceased effort in gift-exchange environments (Fehr, et al. (1998)), and the 
introduction of weak sanctions by the trustor or Nature lowered 'trustworthiness' 
by responders in trust-game (Houser et al. (2010)).
Many theories from social psychology (e.g. Deci (1971), Deci, and Ryan 
(1985), Deci and Ryan (2000) and also from economics (e.g. Frey and Jegen (1999), 
Frey and Jegen (2001), Rob and Zemsky (2001), Huck, Kübler, and Weibull 
(2003)), and Bowles and Huang (2008)) have all been developed to try to show 
how intrinsic and extrinsic motives are related.  For example, it has been thought 
that the introduction of extrinsic motives can change either their 1) desire to 
organize their own actions, 2) their sense of competence 3) their social standing, 
4) their moral obligation, or 5) their identity, all of which are thought to influence 
how individuals feel about performing a particular task.  While the precise 
mechanisms underlying the impact of extrinsic motivators on intrinsic 
motivation are not well understood empirically, most theorists believe that 
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intrinsic motivation can be increased or decreased if it is respectively perceived 
as supportive or thwarting of any of the above factors. 
4.5.   Firm governance
Bowles and Gintis (1988) define the political structure of the economy as 
“the ensemble of rules governing investment, production, and distribution in 
economic institutions.” The political structure of the firm, although embedded 
within the rules and regulations within a larger economic and political system, is 
largely unrestricted in how it makes firm-wide and personnel decisions.  Any 
individual or group associated with the firm, moreover, can be assigned with the 
responsibility of making such decisions.  While it is usually the case that a 
manager or a group of managers is used, ultimate control rights are said to be 
held by the entity within the firm that holds the manager accountable.  For 
instance, in many large corporations, the manager is held accountable by the 
board of directors, which in turn is held accountable by the shareholders of the 
firm.  The composition of the shareholders varies widely from firm to firm with 
equity shares held by the public, employees, a single owner, or the state. 
Although the ownership structure generally influences the distribution decision-
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control rights, this need not be the case.  Many firms assign decision-control 
rights to non-equity owners, including employees, and still others assign rights 
to a co-governance board where equity owners and non-equity owners share 
decision-control rights (Dow, 2003).  One would expect, however, that the precise 
location and composition of members with ultimate control can be extremely 
important since different actors have both a different economic stake and/or 
affective attachment to the firm, and this in turn can influence the normative 
goals pursued by the firm.  Control structures could influence firm policies in 
determining the monitoring structure (mutual monitoring vs bosses), 
compensation structure (relative payment vs fixed payment), and strategies for 
market resiliency (layoffs vs wage-cuts).
While this is a relatively understudied topic in the experimental 
economics literature, this section presents a summary of experiments that inform 
how the governance structure of the firm might affect the motivation of workers.
  
4.5.1 Employee Participation in Firm Governance  
When evaluating the effects of different governance structures, researchers 
would ideally want to know (1) to what extent employee participation is 
consultative, suggestive, or final, (2) the scope of the types of decisions made. 
109
The meta-analysis from Levine and Tyson (1990) over an extensive literature that 
have examined various forms of industrial participation suggests that 
“participation usually has a positive, often small, effect on productivity, 
sometimes a zero or statistically insignificant effect, and almost never a negative 
effect.” They further conclude from their analysis that substantive participation 
(rather than consultative participation) over decisions that directly affect 
conditions of workers on the shop-floor is most likely to produce significant, 
long-lasting increases in productivity.  The authors of refrain from speculating 
over why participation affects productivity, though many explanations tend to be 
repeated in organizational behavior and industrial psychology.  Below, wherever 
possible, we provide evidence testing these claims.
4.5.1.1  Participation increases the intrinsic reward of employment
Evidence from psychology suggests that individuals like to control 
decisions that affect themselves.  Drawing on this insight, Frey et al. (2004) argue 
that authoritative decision-making structures could lead to lower job satisfaction, 
which in turn could lead to lower levels of motivation.  A survey from Frey and 
Benz (2002) reports evidence showing that self-employed workers report higher 
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job satisfaction than non-self-employed workers.  They further find that workers 
in large firm hierarchies report lower job satisfaction than people working in 
small organizations.  
4.5.1.2  Procedural fairness
According to Frey et al. (2004), the evaluation of final outcomes is a 
function of the process that produced the outcome.  In particular, outcomes that 
result from 'fair' processes are seen in a much better light than outcomes that 
result from 'unfair' processes.  In a similar vein, Lind et al. (1993) find that 
litigants who perceive the arbitration process as being 'fair' are much more likely 
to accept court's decision than litigants who do not, after controlling for the 
outcomes.  Greenberg (1990) shows that employees’ reactions to pay cuts are less 
averse if management thoroughly and sensitively explains the basis for the pay 
cuts.  Hewlett Packard's emphasis on transparent and participatory procedures 
have been credited with giving the firm more flexibility than the norm.  For 
example, they have, on occasion, been able to temporarily lower wages by 20 
percent with high support from employees (Weibel and Rota (2001)).
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4.5.1.3.  Participation leads to increases in cooperation and rule compliance
In the literature on Industrial or Workplace Democracy, it is often assumed 
that an equitable distribution of control rights would lead to a firm culture 
supportive of higher levels of worker cooperation and trust, thereby providing 
low-cost solutions to coordination failures through mutual monitoring and work 
norm enforcement (Bowles and Gintis (1998)).   Two recent experimental studies 
have found evidence for a “democracy participation rights premium,” as it 
relates to increased cooperation in simple public good environments.  Dal Bo et 
al. (2007) find that when subjects can vote on either playing a Prisoner's Dilemma 
or a Coordination Game, higher cooperative behavior is elicited regardless of the 
outcome.  They attribute at least some of this behavioral tendency to the intrinsic 
motivation of having been part of a democratic process (controlling for selection 
effects).  Similarly, Sutter et al. (2006) show that in groups allowed to elect rules 
of enforcement for a PG game (punishment or reward), contributions exceed 
those of groups governed by the same (non-elected) rules.  In contrast to these 
studies, however, Kroll et al. (2007), find that introducing a voting mechanism 
has only an impact on contributions to a public good game when a costly 
punishment mechanism is added.  In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I report 
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results from a real-effort experiment comparing work teams with different 
decision-control arrangements.  I find that work teams that were involved in the 
decision over how all group members would be compensated for their effort in 
the experiment performed at higher levels than teams excluded from the 
decision-making process.
4.5.2 Authoritative control
The experiment conducted by Pech (2008) compares team production 
under various treatments where firm decisions over the division of the residual 
claim are made by either a “boss” that is either 1) a part of the work team 
(productive boss), 2) a boss that is not a part of the work team (unproductive 
boss), and 3) no boss.  He finds that work teams with a productive boss 
contribute more to production than members in the 'no-boss' treatment after 
controlling for the division of the residual.  He further shows that when the 
“unproductive boss” is sufficiently generous in the division of the residual, 
workers still reciprocate the generosity of the boss and contribute more than 
groups in the 'no boss' treatment.  
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4.6 Conclusion
A firm's viability is contingent, at least in part, upon the productivity of its 
workers.  Workers draw upon their employment as a source of utility through 
various avenues including the social interaction with other workers and 
managers, the feeling of accomplishment, dignity, social status, and also through 
the intrinsic reward associated with the work task itself.  The firm is partly a kind 
of marketplace -- with institutions that support specific contractual exchange 
relations -- and partly a place where people interact expressively as whole 
personalities, yet economists have primarily focused their study on monetary 
variables as and neglected psychological and social variables.  We speculate that 
this is due to the use of the rational choice model since its assumptions define a 
specific psychology and social orientation.  There is no doubt that the RCM can 
be an excellent first-approximation for human behavior, but as Gintis (2009) 
suggests, “the well has run dry” on what we can study by sticking exclusively to 
the RCM.  
In this chapter we have given many examples of a growing body of 
experimental data that is contributing to the study of personnel in the workplace. 
While most of the studies reviewed examine the predictions of utilitarian-based 
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models of motivation, others are more exploratory in nature.  As we have 
reported, some findings are consistent with predictions of the RCM, and others 
are not.  This, however, is not important.  What is important is that a clear path is 
now in place to move Economics into the realm of real-world behavior where 
psychological, cultural, ideological, and economic influences can be reasonably 
evaluated with observation rather than by assumption.  The hope is for more 
personnel theorists and practitioners to accept the results from experimental 
studies as necessary and useful.  
As we have shown, experiments offer the opportunity to test-bed 
institutional innovations in the compensation structure, the labor market 
conditions, the organization of the firm, the ownership structure, and the 
governance structure.  The main strength of using experiments is the added 
control over conditions that better allow for isolating the relationship being 
investigated.  Experiments, moreover, can be easily replicated and expanded to 
include theoretical or counterfactual ideas that may not exist in the 'real-world.' 
The results from experimental data will not always map perfectly to the 
population or phenomenon of interest and should therefore be thought of as a 
tool that is complementary to other empirical methods.  
Although experiments have been used to expand on these analyses over 
115
the past two decades, our review points to some issues that remain largely 
understudied.  Specifically, there remains a large gap between the work done in 
industrial psychology and the work in economics investigating the motivational 
effects of different workplace governance practices and asset ownership 
distributions.  Most existing theories in industrial psychology are modeled in 
non-utilitarian frameworks (possibly contributing to their neglect by 
economists), but experiments offer both a method to test many of the behavioral 
claims made in this work and a means of facilitating their incorporation into 
economic practice.  Chapter 2 of this dissertation provides an example for this 
type of work.  
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APPENDIX A  
HISTOGRAMS
Figure A1:  Total Attempts by Period and Treatment 
Period 1 Total Attempted
                        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev. 
Voting               93    12.89247    3.34749
Authority         90    13.14444    3.357236 
Random            87     12.1954    2.443973
Kruskal-Wallis test probability = 0.2170
F-test p value =  0.1090
Period 2 Total Attempted
                        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev. 
Voting                93    15.10753    3.713847 
Authority          90    15.83333    3.598533
Random             87    14.34483    2.735756
Kruskal-Wallis test probability =   0.0347
F-test p value = 0.0150
Period 3 Total Attempted
                        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev. 
Voting                93    13.51613    3.846548
Authority          90    14.95556    4.815497
Random             87    13.35632    3.997025
Kruskal-Wallis test probability =    0.0371
F-test p value =  0.0220
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Figure A2:  Histograms of Correct Answers by Period and Treatment 
Correct Period 1 
                        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev. 
Voting               93    10.50538    3.154099
Authority         90    10.58889    3.613005
Random            87    9.793103     2.54329 
Kruskal-Wallis test probability =    0.5163
F-test p value =  0.1823
Correct Period 2
                          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev. 
Voting                 93    12.10753    3.728452
Authority           90    12.76667    3.750805
Random              87     11.3908    3.236264 
Kruskal-Wallis test probability =   0.1282
F-test p value =   0.0400
Correct Period 3
                        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev. 
Voting             93    10.62366    3.715169
Authority       90    11.68889    4.585381 
Random          87    10.12644    3.753462
Kruskal-Wallis test probability =   0.0576
F-test p value = 0.0323
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APPENDIX B
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS
Introduction (Common for all Treatments)
Thank you for participating in our study today.  You will earn $5 just for showing 
up on time and during the experiment, you will have the opportunity to earn 
more money.  The amount of money that you will get paid depends on your 
actions, as well as the actions of others in this experiment session.  The monetary 
unit that is used throughout the duration of this experiment is an 'experimental 
monetary unit,' (EMU).  At the conclusion of the experiment, all EMUs that you 
have accumulated will be converted into dollars at the rate of 30 EMUs = $1.00. 
You will be paid in cash today, at the end of the experiment.  The money to 
conduct this study has been provided by the National Science Foundation. 
Please note that any and all actions and decisions that you make in the exercises 
or responses you provide are strictly confidential and anonymous.  We intend to 
use the data collected from our study for academic work as it relates to group 
organization.  To assure your responses are confidential, we ask you to not speak 
to each other until the entire study is completed.  
A lab assistant will read all subsequent instructions aloud to you.  Please 
read along with the lab assistant as s/he read them to you.  If you have any 
119
questions while these instructions are being read, please raise your hand and we 
will attempt to answer them.  You are not allowed to communicate with other  
participants during the experiment, even to clarify instructions.  Again, if you have 
any questions, please raise your hand and a lab assistant will assist you.  This 
experiment will have 4 different parts; Period 1, Period 2, Period 3, and a brief 
survey.  At the end of the experiment session, we will call you individually by 
number to give you your earnings in cash.
Instructions for Period 1 (Common for all Treatments)
In this experiment you will be completing a production task that consists 
of adding up sets of five 2-digit numbers.  The use of a calculator is prohibited, 
but you may use scratch paper and pencil provided to you on your desk.  The 
numbers that you will be adding together are randomly drawn and each 
problem is presented in the following way:
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After you submit an answer on the computer, you will be given a new problem 
to solve.  The production task of solving addition problems in Period 1 will last 
for 5 minutes.  At the end of 5 minutes you will be presented with a summary of 
how many problems you correctly solved as well as your payment for Period 1.
Your compensation for solving problems in Period 1 will be a fixed payment of  = 
75 EUs.
At the end of Period 1, we will hand out a new set of instructions for Period 2.
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Period 2 Instructions (Opening Paragraph for Treatment 1:  Voting)
In Period 2 of the experiment, you will be randomly put into a group with 2 
other people (3 total).  Group members are connected through the computer network 
in this room and your identities will remain anonymous throughout the remainder 
of the experiment.  At the beginning of Period 2 you will receive a message that 
indicates that you and the other two group members will democratically decide how 
all group members will be compensated for correctly adding up different sets of 2-
digit numbers.  The democratic process by which your group will reach a decision is 
through a simple voting election.  You will each vote for one of the following two 
compensation schemes (CSs) which will affect the way all three persons in the group 
are compensated.  
The compensation scheme that receives a majority of votes will be implemented.
Period 2 Instructions (Opening paragraph for Treatment 2:  One-decision maker)
In Period 2 of this experiment, you have been randomly put into a group with 
2 other people (3 total).  You are connected through the computer network in this 
room and your respective identities will remain anonymous throughout Period 2. 
Before we begin Period 2, you will receive a message that indicates whether or not 
you have been randomly designated to be a 'decision-maker,' or or not.  
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If you ARE the decision-maker:  You are fully responsible for choosing the 
compensation scheme that will be used for all 3 members of your group (yourself, 
and two others) for correctly adding up different sets of 2-digit numbers.  The other 
members of the group do not have any say in say in this choice.  The decision-maker 
will choose between one either compensation scheme 1, or compensation scheme 2, 
described in detail in the following.    
If you ARE NOT the decision-maker:  You do not have decision-making power 
over the choice of the compensation scheme.  You will simply wait for the 
decision-maker to implement your group's compensation scheme.    
The choice regarding how all group members are compensated (either through  
CS1 or CS2) is completely up to the decision-maker.
Period 2 Instructions (Opening paragraph for Treatment 3:  Computer)
In Period 2 of the experiment, you will be randomly put into a group with 2 
other people (3 total).   Group members are connected through the computer 
network in this room and your identities will remain anonymous throughout the 
remainder of the experiment.  Once you are in a group, a message will be sent to all 
three members that indicates how the members of your group will be compensated 
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for correctly adding up different sets of 2-digit numbers.  The computer will 
randomly choose between 1 of the following 2 compensation schemes which will 
affect the way all three persons in the group are compensated.  
The computer will randomly assign either compensation scheme 1 or compensation  
scheme 2.
[The following are common instructions for all treatments]
Compensation scheme 1 (CS1)  :   If CS1 is chosen, then all of the correct answers 
from all members in the group are summed together.  Each correct answer from the 
group is worth 10EUs.  Under CS1, the person who has the highest number of  
contributions to the group total will receive 60% of all of the proceeds, the second  
highest performer will receive 30% of the proceeds, and the third highest performer  
will receive 10% of the proceeds.
For example:  Let us assume that Subject 1 solves 5 addition problems correctly, 
Subject 2 solves 10 correctly, and Subject 3 solves 15 correctly.
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Subject 1:  5 correct answers
Subject 2:  10 correct answers
Subject 3:  15 correct answers            
5 + 10 + 15 = 30 total correct answers 
30 correct answers  X 10EUs = 300EUs (Total Proceeds)
In this example, the payments for each subject in the group under CS1 are as follows:
Subject 1 would receive:    300EUs X (.10) = 30EUs       (5 Correct)
Subject 2 would receive:    300EUs X (.30) = 90EUs       (10 Correct)
Subject 3 would receive:    300EUs X (.60) = 180EUs     (15 Correct-Highest performer)
Tiebreaker rule:  It is possible that that 2 or more subjects have solved the exact 
same number of addition problems correctly.  Regardless of whether there is a 2-way, 
or 3-way tie, ALL TIES ARE BROKEN AT RANDOM BY THE COMPUTER 
PROGRAM.
An example of a tie between highest and second highest contributions:  Let us 
assume that Subject 1 solves 4 problems, both Subjects 2 and 3 solve 7 problems 
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each.
Subject 1:  4 correct answers
Subject 2:  7 correct answers
Subject 3:  7 correct answers            
4 + 7 + 7 = 18 total correct answers 
18 correct answers  X 10EUs = 180EUs
In this example, Subject's 2 and 3 have each produced the same total of correct 
answers (each with 7 correct).  If there is a tie under CS1, the tie is broken randomly 
by the computer program.  
In this example, under CS1:
Subject 1 would receive with certainty:             180EUs X (.10) = 18 EUs
Subject 2 and Subject 3 could either receive:    180EUs X (.60) = 108 EUs     
      (Depending on tie-break outcome) or
                                                                                            180EUs X (.30) = 54 EUs
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Compensation scheme 2 (CS2):  If CS2 is chosen, all of the correct answers from all 
members in the group are summed together.  Each correct answer from the group is 
worth 10EUs.    Under CS2, every subject in the group will receive the same share of  
the of the total earned by the group.  
For example:  Again, let us assume that Subject 1 solves 5 addition problems 
correctly, Subject 2 solves 10 correctly, and Subject 3 solves 15 correctly.
Subject 1:  5 correct answers
Subject 2:  10 correct answers
Subject 3:  15 correct answers            
5 + 10 + 15 = 30 total correct answers 
30 correct answers  X 10EUs = 300EUs (Total Proceeds)
Under CS2, all subjects receive a the same share of the group total.  In this example, 
the group total is 300EUs, therefore the payoffs to each member is 300EUs/3 group 
members  = 100EUs per subject. 
Payoffs in this example (CS2)
Subject 1 receives 100 EUs (5 Correct answers)
Subject 2 receives 100 EUs                (10 Correct answers)
Subject 3 receives 100 EUs                (15 Correct answers)
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Period 3 Instructions
In Period 3, you will again be presented with the same production task that 
consists of adding up sets of five 2-digit numbers.  The use of a calculator is 
prohibited, but may use scratch paper and pencil provided to you on your desk.  
After you submit an answer on the computer, you will be given a new problem 
to solve.  The production task of solving addition problems in Period 3 will last 
for 5 minutes.  At the end of 5 minutes you will be presented with a summary of 
how many problems you correctly solved as well as your payment for Period 3.  
Your compensation for solving problems in Period 3 will be a fixed payment of 
75 EU.
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APPENDIX C:  
STRATIFIED REGRESSIONS BY DECISION-MAKING POWER 
C.1 Introduction
Throughout the paper we report results of regression analysis that uses 
the expressed preferences of subjects in the experiment that had decision-control 
rights as a co-variate.  Of the 270 subject that participated in the experiment, 123 
had decision-control rights at the outset of Period 2 (all 93 subjects in the Voting 
treatment and 30 subjects in the Authority treatment).
The interpretations of the analysis put forward in the paper hinge on the 
understanding that mean differences in performance explained by the treatment 
occur because the subject is a part of an entire decision-making institution (i.e. 
everyone in the Authority treatment is affected the same way by being in the 
Authority treatment etc).  There is, however, an important issue not explicitly 
considered in the body of the text.  Namely, the compensation scheme 
implemented in the Voting and Authority treatments is a product of the 
expressed preferences of decision-makers and as we mention in the body of the 
paper, there are many motivations that may drive a subject to use their decision-
control right one way or another (strong egalitarian ethic, the desire to challenge 
or be challenged in a competitive environment, lack of confidence of winning a 
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tournament, overconfidence, etc).  Unfortunately, our data do not allow for clean 
test to distinguish one motive over another.  
Our experimental design collects preferences for some subjects (those with 
decision-control rights), but not all subjects.  We cannot, therefore, definitively 
claim that the differences we observe in behavior are fully due to the experience 
of being on one institution or another since it could be that the distribution of 
preferences may not have been randomized to treatment.  In short, we simply do 
not know since we did not have preferences from all subjects.  The worry is that 
the performance of some subjects without decision-making power could be 
driven by having a compensation scheme that they wanted to have implemented, 
had some influence in determining, and also knew that they would perform 
better under that particular compensation scheme.  One way around this issue 
would be to design an alternative experimental protocol that would collect 
preferences from all subjects prior to revealing what the decision-making process 
(the treatments) would be for each subject.  This alternative design would 
produce data that could directly address the critique that the results we report 
are being driven by an uneven distribution of preferences for the compensation 
scheme across treatments.  One can further imagine a design where not only the 
preferences for the compensation scheme are collected, but also a measure of the 
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intensity of preferences using a 5-point likert scale or where subjects must 
provide a relative ranking of the compensation schemes.  After having collected 
preferences from all subjects, the alternative experimental protocol would 
randomize subjects in a session to treatment and the experimental procedure 
would thereafter continue in the same way as the present protocol.
An alternative analytical strategy using the data collected under the 
experimental protocol reported in this paper would stratify the pool of subjects 
by those with decision-making power and those without decision-making power, 
or alternatively further split those cell into groups along various dimensions.  For 
example, the sample could be divided among
• 1)  Groups that have decision-making power (N = 123, Voting = 93, 
Authority = 30, Control = 0)
• 2)  Groups that did not have decision-making power (N = 147, Voting = 0, 
Authority = 60, Control = 87)
• 3) Groups that have decision-making power and expressed a preference 
for a tournament (Overall N = 74; Voting N = 55; Authority = 19; Control = 
0)
• 4) Groups that have decision-making power and expressed a preference 
for the revenue-sharing contract (N = 49; Voting = 38; Authority = 11; 
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Control = 0)
• 5) Groups that have decision-making power, expressed a preference for 
the tournament, and had the tournament contract implemented (Overall 
N = 65, Voting = 46, Authority = 19, Control = 0) 
• 6) Groups that have decision-making power, expressed a preferences for 
the revenue-sharing contract and had the revenue-sharing contract 
implemented (Overall N = 38, Voting = 27, Authority = 11; Control = 0)
• 7) Groups that have decision-making power, expressed a preference for 
the tournament, but had a revenue-sharing contract implemented (Overall 
N = 9, Voting = 9, Authority = 0; Control = 0)
• 8) Groups that have decision-making power, expressed a preferences for 
the revenue-sharing contract, but had a tournament contract implemented 
(Overall N = 11, Voting = 11; Authority = 0; Control = 0) 
among many other possibilities.
C.2 Analysis
By splitting the sample into subgroups, however, we lose observations and 
also the ability to make reliable comparisons in the data-- especially along further 
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stratification that comes by including categorical variables in regression analysis. 
For this reason, we therefore find it reasonable to stratify the data into two 
groups:  those with decision-control rights, and those without decision-control 
rights.  We will first estimating the same model for both groups groups of data 
assuming that the econometric model predicts something about the behavior 
within the group based on the subjects either having power, or not having power. 
Below we test whether the coefficients estimated over the group of 
subjects that had decision-making power are equal to the coefficients estimated 
over subjects that had no decision-making power.  For linear regression, the 
appropriate procedure is to use a Chow or Wald test.25 
First, in Table C.1 below, 6 regression specifications are reported. 
Regressions 1-3 correspond to the group of subject with decision-control rights 
(N = 123), and 4-6 to the groups without decision-control rights (N = 147).  
25   When the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the estimators is used the Wald test is the Chow test 
and vice versa. 
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                     Table C.1 Dependent Variable Total Attempted Questions in Period 2 
By Power 
                                                                        Power == 1                             Power ==0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
voting 0.0181 -0.0973 -0.0606 0 0 0
(0.707) (0.677) (0.401) (0) (0) (0)
authority 0 0 0 1.820*** 1.838*** 0.925***
(0) (0) (0) (0.534) (0.532) (0.323)
cs1 2.147*** 1.551*** 0.528 1.494*** 1.412*** 0.950***
(0.619) (0.570) (0.398) (0.500) (0.494) (0.282)
male 2.000*** 1.006** 0.691 0.357
(0.640) (0.441) (0.485) (0.281)
total1 0.851*** 0.850***
(0.0745) (0.0496)
Constant 13.77*** 13.35*** 3.423*** 13.42*** 13.07*** 3.187***
(0.688) (0.669) (0.974) (0.426) (0.509) (0.622)
Observations 123 123 123 147 147 147
R-squared 0.082 0.150 0.684 0.128 0.140 0.71
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We want to test whether the coefficients estimated for subjects with 
decision-making power are equal to the coefficients estimated over subjects that 
had no decision-making power.  To do this we follow the sequential Wald-test 
procedure from Gould (2007), of pooling the data, estimating the fully interacted 
model, and then testing the second group (those with decision-making power ) 
coefficients against 0.   
In Table C.2 we report the results of the 'pooled' regressions.  Regression 
(1) pools Regression (1) and (4) from Table C.1.  Similarly Regression (2) pools (2) 
and (5), and Regression (3) pools (3) and (6).
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 Table C.2 Dependent Variable Total Attempted Questions in Period 2 (Pooled)
(1) (2) (3)
voting 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0)
authority 1.820*** 1.838*** 0.925***
(0.535) (0.533) (0.324)
cs1 1.494*** 1.412*** 0.950***
(0.501) (0.494) (0.282)
male 0.691 0.357
(0.486) (0.282)
total1 0.850***
(0.0496)
power1 0.374 0.183 0
(0.632) (0.685) (0)
power1voting 0 0 0.175
(0) (0) (1.172)
power1authority -1.838** -1.740** -0.689
(0.885) (0.860) (1.238)
power1cs1 0.653 0.139 -0.422
(0.795) (0.754) (0.488)
power1male 1.308 0.650
(0.803) (0.523)
power1total1 0.000916
(0.0894)
Constant 13.42*** 13.07*** 3.187***
(0.427) (0.510) (0.623)
Observations 270 270 270
R-squared 0.105 0.145 0.698
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
For all three 'Pooled' regressions, we fail to reject the hypothesis 
simultaneously testing all linear restrictions with Prob > F = 0.1568 for Pooled 
Specification (1), Prob > F =    0.1254 for Pooled Specification (2), and Prob > F = 
0.3692 for Pooled Specification (3). 
We conclude that there are no differences in the coefficients estimated for 
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subjects with decision-making power are equal to the coefficients estimated over 
subjects that had no decision-making power.  We can now confidently combine 
the group of subjects with decision-making power with those without decision-
making power since there are no statistical differences between the groups.  
Tables C.3 and C.4 take the same steps with effective effort as the 
dependent variable.  Table C.3 splits the sample between group 1 (those with 
decision-making power) and group 2 (those without decision-making power. 
                Table C.3 Dependent Variable Correct Answers in Period 2 
          By Power 
                                                                         Power == 1                             Power ==0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
voting 0.380 0.288 0.0475 0 0 0
(0.728) (0.706) (0.438) (0) (0) (0)
authority 0 0 0 1.861*** 1.881*** 1.061***
(0) (0) (0) (0.588) (0.586) (0.391)
cs1 1.939*** 1.460** 0.502 1.155** 1.066* 0.517
(0.612) (0.584) (0.504) (0.559) (0.560) (0.395)
male 1.609** 0.751 0.757 0.797**
(0.664) (0.524) (0.555) (0.382)
correct1 0.782*** 0.822***
(0.0889) (0.0659)
Constant 10.54*** 10.20*** 3.197*** 10.67*** 10.29*** 2.561***
(0.722) (0.736) (0.943) (0.501) (0.573) (0.754)
Observations 123 123 123 147 147 147
R-squared 0.068 0.111 0.536 0.092 0.103 0.596
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We now follow the Wald-test procedure from Gould (2007) of pooling the 
data, estimating the fully interacted model, and then testing the second group 
(those with decision-making power) coefficients against 0.   
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                Table C.4. Dependent Variable Correct Answers in Period 2 (Pooled)
(1) (2) (3)
voting 0 0 1.109*
(0) (0) (0.587)
authority 1.861*** 1.881*** 1.061***
(0.588) (0.587) (0.392)
cs1 1.155** 1.066* 0.517
(0.560) (0.560) (0.395)
male 0.757 0.797**
(0.555) (0.383)
correct1 0.822***
(0.0660)
power1 0.245 0.192 -0.426
(0.651) (0.706) (1.225)
power1voting 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0)
power1authority -2.242** -2.169** 0
(0.935) (0.917) (0)
power1cs1 0.784 0.394 -0.0148
(0.828) (0.809) (0.640)
power1male 0.852 -0.0462
(0.865) (0.648)
power1correct1 -0.0399
(0.111)
Constant 10.67*** 10.29*** 2.561***
(0.501) (0.574) (0.755)
Observations 270 270 270
R-squared 0.081 0.107 0.568
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
For all three 'Pooled' regressions, we fail to reject the hypothesis 
simultaneously testing all linear restrictions with Prob > F =    0.1287 for Pooled 
Specification (1), Prob > F = 0.1502 for Pooled Specification (2), and Prob > F = 
0.4172 for Pooled Specification (3). 
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C.3 Winners and Losers
The last part of this exercise investigates if there was a difference among 
individuals that had decision-control rights and whether their expressed 
preference resulted in the compensation scheme implemented.  As mentioned 
above, we would have liked to have collected preferences from all subjects in our 
experiment, in part to examine this issue.  We do, however, have 93 observations 
from the Voting treatment were we have all of the preferences from subjects 
which is not a small sample compared with other experimental studies.  All 
subjects expressed a preference for a compensation scheme, in order to have that 
compensation scheme implemented, at least one other person in their group of 
three (all interactions were anonymous) needed to express the same preference.  
Below we examine if there was a difference between subjects that had their 
preference implemented and those that did not have their preference 
implemented.  Considering only the subsample of people in the Voting 
treatment, in the reference category in Regression 1 (in Table C.5 and C.6) are 
subjects that had the revenue sharing contract implemented in Period 2.  On 
average, subjects that had the tournament compensation scheme implemented 
attempted 1.988 more questions, answering 1.898 more questions on average 
than subjects under the revenue-sharing contract.  Both differences are significant 
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at the .01 level.  The reference category in Regression 2 are subjects that 
expressed a preference for the revenue-sharing contract.  They attempted an 
average of 1.695 fewer questions answering 1.650 fewer questions than subjects 
that voted for the tournament contract.  These differences are also significant at 
the .01 level. 
In Regression 3 in from Table C.5 and C.6 we find that after controlling for 
the preference expressed, subjects attempted 1.502 more questions and answered 
1.407 more questions than the reference category – or those subjects under the 
revenue sharing contract and also expressed a preference for the revenue sharing 
contract.   
In Regressions 4-6 we include the interaction of subjects that expressed a 
preference for the tournament with the implementation of the tournament.  In 
Regression 4, the reference category are subjects that expressed a preference for 
the revenue-sharing contract and also had the revenue-sharing contract 
implemented.  From Table C.5, those subjects, on attempted 13.85 questions. 
Subjects that expressed a preference for the revenue-sharing contract attempted, 
but 'lost' since the tournament contract was implemented answered an average of 
0.875 more questions than the reference category.  This difference, however, is not 
statistically significant.  Similarly, subjects that expressed a preference for the 
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tournament but had a revenue-sharing contract implemented answered 0.148 
more questions than the reference category (Table C.5).  This is also not 
significantly different from zero.  Subjects that expressed a preference for the 
tournament and had the tournament implemented attempted 0.148+0.875+1.277 = 
2.30 more questions than the reference category.  T-tests examining if there is a 
difference between coefficients are all rejected.
(1) Ho:  tournament = pref_tourn =tournament*pref_tourn
Prob > F = 0.7345
(2) Ho:  tournament = pref_tourn
Prob > F =  0.6030
(3) Ho:  tournament = tournament*pref_tourn
Prob > F =  0.8538
Similar analysis, not reported here holds for Regressions 5 and 6 and also 
for Table C.6 analysis shows that there was not a difference in behavior among 
subjects that 'won' or subjects that 'lost' the election of a compensation scheme 
using data from the Voting treatment.  
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Table C.5 Dependent Variable Total Attempted Questions in Period 2:
          Winners and Losers  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cs1 1.988*** 1.502** 0.875 0.950 0.628
(0.722) (0.691) (0.973) (0.952) (0.540)
votecs1 1.695** 0.873 0.148 -0.261 0.199
(0.731) (0.697) (0.966) (0.928) (0.950)
cs1votecs1 1.277 0.820 -0.289
(1.369) (1.326) (1.203)
male 1.839** 1.034*
(0.840) (0.523)
total1 0.843***
(0.0925)
Constant 13.89*** 14.11*** 13.67*** 13.85*** 13.44*** 3.411***
(0.499) (0.493) (0.563) (0.626) (0.588) (1.158)
Observations 93 93 93 93 93 93
R-squared 0.069 0.051 0.078 0.083 0.134 0.669
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:  Voting treatment only
Table C.6    Dependent Variable Correct Answers in Period 2:
 Winners and Losers  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cs1 1.898*** 1.407* 0.838 0.895 0.896
(0.697) (0.745) (1.022) (1.014) (0.802)
votecs1 1.650** 0.881 0.222 -0.0885 -0.466
(0.715) (0.762) (0.991) (0.993) (1.163)
cs1votecs1 1.159 0.812 -0.105
(1.484) (1.483) (1.461)
male 1.398 0.925
(0.866) (0.685)
correct1 0.766***
(0.122)
Constant 10.94*** 11.13*** 10.72*** 10.89*** 10.58*** 3.419***
(0.426) (0.437) (0.470) (0.497) (0.475) (1.191)
Observations 93 93 93 93 93 93
R-squared 0.062 0.048 0.072 0.076 0.105 0.484
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
                                                                         Notes:  Voting treatment only
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APPENDIX D
TESTING STATSISTICAL EQUIVALENCE OF PERIOD 3 AND PERIOD 1
Table D.1 Effort (Testing Statistical Equivalence of Period 3 and Period 1)
Overall
Paired t test
Variable     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
  total3       270    13.94444    .2607503    4.284565    13.43107    14.45782
  total1       270    12.75185    .1888527    3.103167    12.38003    13.12367  
    diff         270    1.192593    .1995446    3.278853    .7997248     1.58546
mean(diff) = mean(total3 - total1)                           t =   5.9766
Ho: mean(diff) = 0                                                     degrees of freedom =      269
Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
-> Voting treatment 
Paired t test
Variable      Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
  total3          93    13.51613    .3988685    3.846548    12.72394    14.30832
  total1          93    12.89247    .3471188    3.347492    12.20307    13.58188  
    diff            93    .6236559    .2785431    2.686172    .0704453    1.176867
 mean(diff) = mean(total3 - total1)                           t =   2.2390
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                                                     degrees of freedom =       92
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9862         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0276          Pr(T > t) = 0.0138
-> Authority treatment
Paired t test
Variable      Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
  total3           90    14.95556     .507598    4.815497    13.94697    15.96414
  total1           90    13.14444    .3538838    3.357236    12.44128     13.8476  
    diff             90    1.811111    .3661366    3.473477    1.083605    2.538617
 mean(diff) = mean(total3 - total1)                           t =   4.9465
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                                                    degrees of freedom =       89
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
> Control treatment 
Paired t test
Variable      Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
  total3           87    13.35632    .4285261    3.997025    12.50444     14.2082
  total1           87     12.1954     .2620214    2.443973    11.67452     12.71628
    diff             87     1.16092    .3816401     3.559702    .4022441     1.919595  
     mean(diff) = mean(total3 - total1)                           t =   3.0419
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                                                         degrees of freedom =       86
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9984         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0031          Pr(T > t) = 0.0016
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Table D.2 Effective Effort(Testing Statistical Equivalence of Period 3 and 
Period 1)
Paired t test
Variable      Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
correct3       270    10.81852    .2479742    4.074632     10.3303    11.30674
correct1       270     10.3037     .191629      3.148786     9.92642    10.68099
    diff           270    .5148148    .1988346    3.267185    .1233449    .9062847
 mean(diff) = mean(correct3 - correct1)                       t =   2.5892
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                                                         degrees of freedom =      269
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9949         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0101          Pr(T > t) = 0.0051
-> Voting treatment 
Paired t test
Variable      Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
correct3       93       10.62366     .385245    3.715169    9.858526    11.38879
correct1       93      10.50538    .3270648    3.154099    9.855797    11.15496
    diff           93      .1182796    .3072482    2.962994   -.4919419     .728501
mean(diff) = mean(correct3 - correct1)                       t =   0.3850
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                                                         degrees of freedom =       92
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.6494         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7012          Pr(T > t) = 0.3506
-> Authority treatment
Paired t test
Variable       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
correct3        90    11.68889    .4833416    4.585381     10.7285    12.64928
correct1        90    10.58889    .3808442    3.613005     9.83216    11.34562
    diff            90    1.100000    .3893238     3.69345    .3264219    1.873578
mean(diff) = mean(correct3 - correct1)                       t =   2.8254
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                                                         degrees of freedom =       89
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9971         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0058          Pr(T > t) = 0.0029
-> Control treatment
Paired t test
Variable      Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
correct3       87    10.12644    .4024134    3.753462    9.326465    10.92641
correct1       87    9.793103    .2726693     2.54329    9.251055    10.33515
    diff           87    .3333333    .3272636    3.052512   -.3172452    .9839119
mean(diff) = mean(correct3 - correct1)                       t =   1.0185
 Ho: mean(diff) = 0                                                         degrees of freedom =       86
 Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8444         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3113          Pr(T > t) = 0.1556
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APPENDIX E:  
MOTIVATIONAL CROWDING
An alternative interpretation of the data collected in Period 3, however, is 
that they measure the willingness to provide effort in the absence of any extrinsic 
incentives-- or their intrinsic motivation for performing the production task. 
Notice that at the beginning of Period 1, subjects had no prior experience with 
the specific production task used for the duration of the experiment but by 
Period 3 the subjects had 10 minutes of experience and they were also told that 
their compensation would be identical to the compensation received in Period 1 
(a flat-wage payment of 75 EUs).  The data in Period 3 further allow us an 
opportunity to study if the experience of the experiment led to any systematic 
increases or decreases in effort in Period 3.  
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            Table E.1   Dependent Variable Total Attempted Questions in Period 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
voting 0.160 0.170 0.172 0.111 -0.808 -1.528* -1.457*
(0.585) (0.589) (1.181) (1.160) (0.902) (0.786) (0.784)
authority 1.599** 1.582** 1.566** 1.604** 0.683 -0.0694 0.00757
(0.664) (0.658) (0.744) (0.744) (0.575) (0.496) (0.514)
tournament 1.353*** 0.832 0.684 0.0844 -0.569 -0.487
(0.512) (0.557) (0.567) (0.455) (0.459) (0.468)
tourn_preference 0.697 0.741 0.771 1.347* 1.236*
(1.107) (1.072) (0.818) (0.699) (0.712)
revshar_preference -1.022 -0.502 0.0573 0.589 0.528
(1.057) (1.085) (0.831) (0.747) (0.737)
male 1.456*** 0.864** 0.356 0.410
(0.533) (0.416) (0.397) (0.396)
total1 0.854*** 0.236
(0.0691) (0.161)
total2 0.904*** 0.725***
(0.0521) (0.138)
Constant 13.36*** 12.52*** 12.84*** 12.09*** 2.397** 0.534 0.144
(0.428) (0.591) (0.615) (0.636) (1.052) (0.875) (0.928)
Observations 270 270 270 270 270 270 270
R-squared 0.028 0.052 0.066 0.092 0.451 0.544 0.553
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
   
In Table E.1, we report seven regression specifications examining Period 3 
Effort.  Regression 7 in the table regresses effort on the treatments, compensation 
scheme implemented, expressed preferences, gender, and the total number of 
questions attempted in Period 1 and Period 2 respectively.  Controlling for all 
other co-variates, subjects in the Voting treatment attempted 1.457 questions less 
than the reference group which is significant at the 0.10 level, and subjects that 
expressed a preference for the tournament prior to Period 2 attempted 1.236 
more questions than the reference group.  Regression 7 also shows that an 
additional question attempted in Period 2 resulted in 0.725 questions attempted 
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in Period 3 on average.  This was significant at the 0.01 level of significance. 
Regression 5 shows an additional question attempted in Period 1 resulted in 
0.854 additional questions attempted in Period 3 which was significant at the 0.05 
level, but after including Period 2 effort into the regression specification, Period 1 
effort is still positive, but no longer statistically significant.
                      Table E.2:  Dependent Variable Correct Answers in Period 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
voting 0.497 0.508 0.534 0.491 -0.584 -1.204 -1.194
(0.557) (0.553) (1.111) (1.094) (0.905) (0.813) (0.815)
authority 1.562** 1.544** 1.543** 1.569** 0.792 0.128 0.194
(0.629) (0.620) (0.721) (0.728) (0.579) (0.529) (0.520)
tournament 1.424*** 1.103** 1.000* 0.524 0.148 0.180
(0.472) (0.502) (0.509) (0.394) (0.417) (0.385)
tourn_preference 0.405 0.436 0.527 1.290* 1.097
(1.037) (1.012) (0.872) (0.778) (0.800)
revshar_preference -0.654 -0.291 0.777 1.017 1.108
(0.987) (0.991) (0.772) (0.724) (0.712)
male 1.016** 0.758* 0.189 0.305
(0.499) (0.393) (0.380) (0.370)
correct1 0.772*** 0.322***
(0.0744) (0.103)
correct2 0.763*** 0.556***
(0.0568) (0.0871)
Constant 10.13*** 9.242*** 9.442*** 8.922*** 1.810** 1.233* 0.347
(0.402) (0.509) (0.524) (0.586) (0.854) (0.729) (0.791)
Observations 270 270 270 270 270 270 270
R-squared 0.025 0.054 0.060 0.074 0.408 0.485 0.513
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Similar to Table E.1, in Table E.2 we report the same seven regression 
specifications examining Effective Effort in Period 3.  After controlling for 
treatment, compensation scheme implemented, expressed preferences, gender, 
and the number of correct answers Regression 7 in Table 8 shows that the 
inclusion of the number of correct answers in Periods 1 and 2 are positively and 
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significantly correlated with the number of correct answers in Period 3.  The 
respective additional effect for a correct answer in Period 1 and Period 2 was 
0.322 and 0.556 additional correct answers in Period 3 controlling for all other co-
variates in the specification.  No other co-variates are significant in the full 
specification.  
The findings reported in Tables E.1 and E.2 suggest that the conditions of 
the experiment did not contribute to any crowding-in or out in Period 3 per se, 
but they do suggest that past success in production contributed to more effective 
effort in Period 3.  
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APPENDIX F
SURVEY QUESTIONS
Subjective reports of satisfaction
How satisfied are you with...
1)  The sense of achievement that you get from your job?
2)  The scope for using your own initiative?
3)  The amount of influence you have over your own work?
4)  The training that you receive?
5)  The amount of pay that you receive?
6)  Your job security?
7)  The work itself?
Employee Voice
Overall, how good would you say managers at this workplace are at...
1)  Seeking the views of employees or employee representatives?
2)  Responding to suggestions from employees or employee representatives?
3)  Allowing employees or employee representatives to influence final decisions?
4)  Overall, how satisfied are you with the amount of involvement you have in 
decision-making at this workplace?  
Autonomy
In general, how much influence do you have...
1)  Over the tasks you do in your work?
2)  The pace at which you work? 
3)  How you do your work?
4)  The order in which you carry out your tasks?
5)  The time you start or finish your working day?
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